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ABSTRACT 
Because natural resource exploration and development are 
inherently risky undertakings, information can be a valuable 
commodity in these processes. 
A survey of the literature concerning information and 
resources is contained in Chapter 1, and the areas of interest for this 
thesis are introduced. 
Aspects of the role of information early in the exploration 
process are considered in Chapter 2, as the public and private provision 
and valuation of exploratory information are examined. The role of 
information in market performance is not independent of the allocation 
institutions under consideration, so several are examined. Furthermore, 
the role of publicly provided information as a remedy for problems 
in information provision is critically evaluated. It is shown that 
if the publicly provided information is not perfect, its potential 
for eliminating, or even reducing, private overvaluation can not 
be assured. 
Next, in Chapter 3, consequences of the joint provision 
of resources and information are examined in the context of problems 
of information inexcludability. This essay presents the case in 
which more than one firm owns land in a geologically related area. 
Each firm can provide valuable information to the other, and each 
firm recognizes this predicament. The problem is developed first 
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as one of noncooperative play of a two person game, with particular 
attention then given to the theory and performance of cooperative 
institutions for sharing the resource,information. This essay is not 
merely an abstract conjecture, for such cooperative institutions 
are quite common in the oil industry. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, the observation that information 
is a valuable commodity in natural resource markets is once again 
combined with the fact that such information is often produced jointly 
with the oil and gas product to demonstrate that price controls on 
petroleum properties can produce unintended results. This follows 
from the alteration in firm optimal extraction paths when price 
controls are present. 
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INFORMATION IN RESOURCE EXPLORATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT: INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Information, in a world of uncertainty, can be a valuable 
commodity. That is, individuals and/or firms, when faced with 
uncertainty, are often willing to pay in order to receive information 
about the state of the world. While such information could be data 
about future demand, about the distribution of prices in a 
market, or about possible changes in technology, these papers are 
concerned specifically with information about natural resources: 
the amount of oil located under a particular tract of land, 
the richness of a copper vein, or the sulfur content of a coal 
resource. While the objective existence of these facts is not 
random, man's knowledge of them is imperfect, so the convention that 
they represent uncertainty is adopted. Because of the author's' 
own knowledge and interest, the primary focus of the survey will be 
petroleum resources. 
One reason individuals or firms may value information is 
that they are risk averse and are willing to pay to reduce or 
eliminate uncertainty. More important for this analysis is that 
risk neutral individuals or firms can value information, for.when 
production costs must be incurred ex ante (that is, before the 
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true state of nature is revealed), expected profits can be increased 
when better information is available. 
If valuable information were just another commodity, like 
apples or oranges, the standard economic theorems (Arrow, 1951) in 
which Pareto optimum is achieved by a competitive market would hold 
(these theorems utilize conditions that production sets are convex 
and that there are no externalities in production or consumption). 
However, there are at least four important characteristics of 
information, including especially resource information, which violate 
certain assumptions of the fundamental theorems and which have 
required the development of a distinct "economics of information." 
First, there are typically economies of scale in the 
production of information {see Arrow, 1974). To tell the first oil 
company whether a promising geological structure exists below 
a particular tract will typically cost a large initial sum. To 
transfer this information to all other oil companies will cost 
some smaller additional amount for reproduction costs. When there 
is the case of a large inital fixed cost with a small, constant 
marginal production cost, the convexity conditions used in the 
welfare theorems are violated. In a competitive market for this 
information, the marginal optimality conditions require that price 
equal the constant marginal production cost. However, no firm can 
earn nonnegative profits at this price because of the large fixed 
costs. In the long run, the firms would leave the industry and 
the information would not be produced, perhaps even when it could 
make some or all persons and/or firms better off. 
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Efficient production of information could also be achieved 
by a perfect price discriminating monopolist. Even aside from the 
distributional issues (the monopolist would extract all the benefits 
from the information) a second feature typical of information poses 
a severe problem: it is difficult to establish property rights in 
information. As has been pointed out in both Arrow [1974] and 
Montgomery and Quirk [1974] once a monopoly information firm sells 
information to a single buyer, that purchaser becomes a potential 
competitor, destroying the first firm's monopoly position (notice 
that this is more of a problem where information does not lose its 
value as time passes; a week old newspaper depreciates more than a 
week old aerial photograph of physical terrain). Although it may 
seem to be the natural approach, addressing this problem through 
copyrights or patents has not proven to be easy. 
The third problem, which is especially typical of information 
about natural resources, is nonexcludability. An oil firm which drills 
a test well and then continues field development is tipping off everyone 
else who has observed its actions. As Arrow [1974] noted, "The very 
use of information in any productive way is bound to reveal it, at 
least in part." Peterson [1975] and Stiglitz [1975) have explored 
this information externality as it relates to petroleum exploration. 
Peterson provides figures which confirm Arrow's contention in that 
successful exploration activity on one tract tends to drive up the 
value of other tracts which might be geologically related. 
Each of the three facets of information discussed in the 
preceding paragraphs (indivisibility, inability to define property 
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rights, and inexcludability) leads to the same qualitative conclusions: 
the private marketplace will tend to underproduce information relative 
to the social optimum. Hirshleifer [1971], however, demonstrated that 
the divergence between private and social value can go the other 
direction: the private value of information can be greater than 
its social value, with too many resources spent on producing information. 
The most famous illustration is the amount of resources spent at the 
racetrack by participants attempting to win the bet on the fastest 
horse. There are other economic examples of this phenomenon: the 
typical conditions are that the information is being utilized in 
mechanisms of redistributing resources from one person to another 
rather than in creating additional total wealth. 
II. THE LITERATURE ON THE ROLE OF TNFORMATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE 
EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
While the special characteristics of information markets 
have necessitated an "economics of information" (Hirshleifer and 
Riley, 1979), surprisingly little has been written about the 
application of this general topic to natural resource exploration 
and development. This cannot be because the subject is of trivial 
importance. Virtually every oil firm employing more than a few 
persons has geologists and geophysicists and their support staffs 
to produce and process resource information. The Oil and Gas 
Journal reports that in 1977 oil companies spent over a billion 
dollars on geophysical information activity. 1 
The best general reference on the role of information 
gathering and evaluating oil drilling decisions is Grayson [1960]. 
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There are many types of information available to the oil firm: 
aerial photos, rock samples, seismic surveys, data from other 
drilling activity in nearby areas, etc. Not even actually drilling 
a well, logging it, and placing it in production will give an 
absolutely certain profile of the oil resource. Thus, rather than 
being a continuous production process, the Grayson view depicts 
information decisionmaking as a series of discrete choices, nodes 
on a decision tree. At each point, the firm decides whether or not 
to purchase the next bunch of information. If it does not purchase 
the next information, the firm may still proceed in the oil 
exploration or development process, perhaps purchasing other types 
of information along the way. At each decision point, the firm will 
purchase information if the value to the firm of the information is 
greater than the cost. In determining the value of information, 
the firm, as depicted by Grayson, uses essentially the same process 
which is defined more formally in Quirk [1976]. 
The most extensive treatment of a resource information 
problem in the economics literature has been with regard to 
information and the bidding for U.S. offshore oil leases. In this 
literature, it should be noted, pre-sale resource information can 
be shown to affect market structure in two distinct ways. First, 
the information may have social value. Secondly, however, competitive 
sealed bidding as an institutional arrangement can create conditions 
in which information has particular private value to firms. The focus 
of the bidding literature has been on conditions of "asymmetric 
infonnation." As will be shown, the form of the information asymmetry 
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varies widely. 
Hughart [1975] uses a game theoretic framework to develop 
conditions in which a sealed bid competitive auction leads to 
Hirshleifer-type private overinvestment in information. Hughart's 
model can be summarized as follows: 
1) There are two risk neutral firms, one of which, A-Co., has 
access to more information (say an additional seismic test) than 
the other firm, B-Co., (this is the source of the information 
asynnnetry). This is quite similar to Wilson [1967]. 
2) The extra information available to A-Co. classifies all 
tracts as either "good" or "poor." The mean value of good tracts is 
G, of poor tracts P, and of all tracts together M. The proportion 
of all tracts which are good is g, G > M > P > 0, and M = gG + (1 - g)P. 
3) "A-Co.'s bid function has as its sole argument the outcome 
of the geophysical test. B-Co.'s bid function has as its argument 
the A-Co. bid function." 
4) Both firms are aware of the above description of the 
situation, and of all the relevant parameters (G, M, P, g). 
It is easy to see why, in this model of the bidding process, 
the expected outcome is not that each firm bids its own expected 
valuation of each tract. Suppose, for example, that there are two 
tracts, one disclosed to A-Co. as good, the other disclosed to A-Co. 
as poor. A-Co. would, if bidding true expected valuations, bid G 
on the good tract and Pon the poor tract. B-Co. would bid Mon 
both tracts. The result would be a disaster for B-Co., for it would 
win the auction on the bad tract and lose the auction on the good 
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tract. Furthermore, this would not be a Nash equilibrium situation, 
for A-Co. could improve its profits by sumbitting a bid of M + E 
on the good tract. 
The Nash equilibrium solutions generated by Hughart entail 
a random bidding strategy by A-Co., with positive expected profits, 
and nonpositive expected profits for B-Co. Thus, there is in this 
model a direct incentive for firms not to be the less informed in 
the bidding. The result is a systematic incentive for firms who 
hope to remain in the bidding to acqu:;i.re more information, even when 
that is socially wasteful. 
An additional result of Hughart's model is that the proportion 
of economic rent capture by the government (selling the tracts) 
grows as uncertainty decreases. 
Hughart's model generates a kind of curse on B-Co.: it 
wins the bad tracts and loses the good tracts. In a pathbreaking 
article, Capen, Clapp and Campbell [1971] derive a type of "winners' 
curse" which states that "in competitive bidding, the winner tends 
to be the player who most overestimates the tract value." This 
conclusion also comes from a model with asymmetric information, 
but the asymmetry takes a different form than in Hughart. Recall 
that in Hughart's model, only on the "poor" tracts was the winning 
bidder the one who overestimated the tract's true value. This 
distinction can be traced to the different types of information 
asymmetry. In Hughart, one firm is "more informed" that the other 
(B-Co. would be willing, ex ante, to trade places with A-Co.). In 
the Capen, Clapp and Campbell piece, each firm is viewed as drawing 
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a random variable from the same distribution. That is, no one firm 
has any ~ information than another, .but the information is 
noisy - - it consists of a signal which is a random variable with 
a joint probability distribution with the true value of the tract. 
The firms estimate the value of the tract conditional upon the 
informational signal they have received. As Capen, Clapp, and 
Campbell, and later Klein [1976], point out, the expected value 
of the highest (i.e., winning) bid derived from this random signal 
is higher than the expected value of the tract even if the signal 
itself is unbiased. The winner in this model is always cursed, and 
the rational bidder will reduce his bid by some positive amount from 
its own true expected value of the tract (based upon the random signal). 
Klein's extension is to demonstrate that there is a direct incentive 
for the formation of joint ventures, as the bid based upon the average 
of the estimates of the members of the joint venture is more accurate 
than the result if the members bid separately. 
The most recent work in the Capen, Clapp, and Campbell 
tradition is Reece [1978] and [1979]. Reece is most concerned with 
the effects of reducing uncertainty upon the distribution of rent 
between the government and the winning bidder, and thus, like 
Hughart, must explicitly consider the Nash equilibrium which one 
expects from a particular institution. Utilizing a computer analysis, 
the first order conditions for a firm's optimum were solved to obtain 
the equilibrium rents obtained by the government. With some estimates 
as to real world fixed costs and signal variance (assumed to be log 
normal) the resulting calculations indicate that as uncertainty 
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(defined as the variance of the log of the signal) declines, the 
proportion of total possible rent which returns to the government 
approaches 1. 
The Reece papers directly incorporate a feature of 
offshore oil drilling which Hughart, Capen, et al. and Klein do 
not consider, namely that there will typically be fixed costs 
associated with drilling and developing an oil resource after the 
leases are awarded but before the random variable is known. In 
a world of fixed costs of drilling, another feature of many of 
these models needs to be carefully considered: the oil companies 
do not, as is often described, obtain information in the form of the 
value of the tract; they obtain information on the physical structures. 
Without fixed drilling costs, it is reasonable to assume a transformation 
exists between information about how much oil is present and the 
value of the tract. However, with ex ante drilling costs, the 
value of the tract depends on how much information is available. 
The very process of conducting a seismic survey can increase 
ex ante the value of the tract. 
To summarize the various papers on offshore oil bidding 
Table 1 classifies each of the four articles discussed here according 
to three questions: 1) Which type of information asymmetry is 
employed: different firms have different amount of information, so 
some are better informed than others (Type I), or different firms 
each have a single draw of a random information signal from an 
identical underlying distribution (Type II)? 2) Do the authors 
include fixed costs of drilling? 3) Do the authors explore the 
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TABLE 1 
Type of Fixed costs of Nash equilibria 
asymmetry drilling? considered? 




Capen, Clapp Type II No No I I and Cambell i I 
I 
Klein Type II No No I 
I 
I 
Reece Type II Yes Yes 
I 
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question of Nash equilibria? 
III. ISSUES IN RESOURCE INFORMATION ADDRESSED IN THIS THESIS 
The essays presented here address three different aspects 
of the role of information in natural resource exploration and 
development. 
Aspects of the role of information early in the exploration 
process are considered in Chapter 2, as the public and private provision 
of pre-drilling exploratory information are examined. The divergence 
between public and private valuation of exploratory information 
reflects the issues raised by Hirshleifer and the competitive bidding 
literature (as discussed in section I of this chapter). Market 
structure and the role of information in market performance are not 
independent of the allocation institution under consideration. There 
are ways, other than by an auction procedure, in which the rights 
to explore and drill for oil could be allocated. As the institutions 
vary, the role of information may change. Therefore, in Chapter 2, 
public and private valuation of information in other institutional 
settings are evaluated. Furthermore, the role of publicly provided 
information as a remedy for some information provision problems is 
critically examined. It is shown that if the publicly provided 
information is not perfect, its potential for eliminating, or even 
reducing, private overvaluation cannot be assured. 
Next, in Chapter 3, consequences of the joint provision 
of resources and information are examined in the context of problems 
of information inexcludability. This essay presents the case in 
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which more than one firm owns land in a geologically related area. 
Each firm can provide valuable information to the other, and each 
firm recognizes this predicament. The problem is developed first 
as one of noncooperative play of a two person game, with particular 
attention then given to the theory and performance of cooperative 
institutions for sharing the resource information. This essay is 
not merely an abstract conjecture, for such cooperative institutions 
are quite common in the oil industry. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, the observation that information is 
a valuable commodity in natural resource markets is once again 
combined with the fact that such information is often produced jointly 
with the oil and gas product to demonstrate that price controls on 
petroleum properties can produce unintended results. This follows 
from the alteration in firm optimal extraction paths when price 
controls are present. 
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FOOTNOTE FOR CHAPTER 1 
1. Oil and Gas Journal, vol, 77 No. 21, May 21, 1979, p. 100. 
/ 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE VALUE OF INFORMATION IN RESOURCE EXPLORATION: 
THE INTERACTION OF STRATEGIC PLAYS AND INSTITUTIONAL RULES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One characteristic of the search for the production of many 
natural resources is the uncertainty facing firms in the exploration 
process. Because exploring firms typically must make expenditure 
decisions before the true state of nature is revealed, perhaps even 
before the right to produce the resource is allocated, information·can be 
a valuable commodity to the risk neutral firm, and to society. Typical 
of this early-stage information gathering is the tremendous number of 
tests, surveys, and analyses performed by oil corporations before the 
first wildcat exploratory well is ever begun. 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, several aspects of information 
(indivisibility, inability to define property rights, inexcludability) 
which can cause a private, competitive market to produce a suboptimal 
amount of information were examined. In addition, as was shown by 
Hirshleifer [1971], private competitive markets may have agents which 
value information so as to lead to private overinvestment·in information. 
This difference in valuation can occur because private purchasers take 
account not only of the value of the information in increasing the total 
of expected profits, but also of the potential for privately informed 
firms to adapt their own actions in a manner which merely serves to 
redistribute resources away from others. Such information expenditures, 
aimed solely at redistribution, are, from society's point of view, a 
wasteful use of resources. 
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It is undoubtedly true that these three observations about 
information (information can be valuable; private markets may, in some 
cases, underproduce information; private markets may, in other cases, 
lead to an overinvestment in private information) have motivated 
interest in publicly provided information about natural resources. 
This discussion has been particularly prominent in the literature 
concerning the auctioning of offshore oil drilling rights by the U.S. 
government. Hughart [1975], for example, specifically suggests some 
type of government information gathering and announcement program as 
a remedy for problems in private information markets. The United States 
government, through N.A.S.A., has already entered this domain with 
Landsat (an earth images satellite which has been used extensively in 
resource photography [Short, 1977]). Also recently under consideration 
is a newer technology satellite, Stereosat, which would provide 
stereographic earth resources images. 
The evaluation of existing and potential government information 
gathering projects, as well as optimal pricing decisions for the 
information if it is gathered, raises certain fundamental questions 
about public valuation of information. Some of these issues will be 
addressed in thischapter in the context of information about natural 
resources. 
First, in section II, a model of decisionmaking about 
information purchase in natural resource exploration is presented. 
Then, in section III, the valuation calculus of a competitive market 
(in which there are no private over-or under-investment prob.lems) is 
more fully explored. 
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Often, models of information gathering posit the existence of 
a single type of information. The reality of natural resource exploration 
is that there are many types of information, ranging from aerial 
photographs (such as are provided by the Landsat satellites), to ground 
surveys, seismic maps, exploratory drilling, etc. Therefore, in 
section III, information valuation in the context of a multi-source 
world will specifically be considered. 
In section IV, the divergence between private valuation of 
information and its social value is examined. It will be demonstrated 
that such overinvestment can occur in situations other than the auction 
processes where it has already been described. 
In section V, it is confirmed that publicly providing 
information may have value in that it acts as a remedy to private 
overinvestment. Such a desirable effect cannot always be expected; 
in fact, it will be shown that public provision of information can, in 
some circumstances, create incentives for private overinvestment where 
none otherwise existed. 
II. MODELS 
As was described in the introduction, often in the 
remainder of the paper it will be assumed that the resource firm 
must decide ex ante whether or not to incur some fixed development 
cost (such as the cost of drilling). These ex ante fixed costs are 
very important in defining the value of information. For convenience, 
ex post variable production costs and multi-period extraction paths 
will not be explicitly included. 
It will be shown that the value of information differs 
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according to the institutions used to allocate production rights on 
a given tract among several firms. In section III, an "institutionless" 
idealized competitive market will be examined. In section IV the 
value of information in some models analogous to "real world" 
institutions will be explored. 
The model of firm information choice will be similar to 
that protrayed in Grayson [1960]. There are assumed to be some 
number, say J, types of information available. Firms make discrete 
choices whether or not to buy one or more packages of information (a 
group of aerial photographs, a seismic survey, etc.). When a firm 
declines to buy any more information, it may either be abandoning 
the prospect or proceeding directly to development. It will also be 
assumed that the firms view the types of information as being offered 
in some unambiguous ordering (1, 2, .•• , J), determined exogenously. 
In considering whether to make information purchase type 
j, 1 2. j 2. J, the firm will be assumed to act as though it realizes 
that it will act optimally from steps j + 1 to J (so the firm is 
faced with a dynamic programming problem).1 
At all times, it will be assumed that the firms are risk 
neutral and interested in maximizing expected profits. 
III. THE VALUE OF INFORMATION IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT 
This section explores the social value of information in 
competitive circumstances. The term competition is meant to 
indicate a world in which a competitive firm owns the rights to 
explore for and produce minerals in a particular area. Also, in 
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this world there are assumed to be no private distributive gains from 
information [Hirshleifer, 1971]; rather, all gains in expected profits 
to the firm are assumed also to be net additions to the total well-
being of society. The value of information, both to the firm 
and to society, will be the difference in expected profits with 
and without that information being available.
2 
As a first pass, the case in which J • 1 (i.e., in which 
firms have access to no other information except that under 
consideration) is examined. The following definitions will be useful: 
x is the amount of resource in place. x is unknown to the 
firm, and will be considered by the firm to be a random 
variable 
s is a signai, a random variable realized from information 
source 
S is the set of all possible realizations of s 
w(x,s) is the joint p.d.f. of x and s 
h(s) is the marginal probability of s 
f(x) is the marginal probability of x 
g(xjs) is. the conditional probability of x givens, constructed 
according to Bayes' rule 
K is an ex ante deyelqp~ent decision, K E {O,l}. (For example, 
K = 0 means don't drill, K = 1 means drill.) Where a 
subscript I is used, as in K
1
, this is intended to denote 
specifically the decision when some information I is available. 
Likewise, ~ specifically denotes that the information is not 
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available. With no subscript, K denotes either case. 
F is the fixed cost associated with K = 1. 
P is the price of the resource. 
If the firm decides to drill, it will incur only the fixed 
cost, F. Variable extraction costs are assumed to be zero. Under this 
assumption, the firm will extract all of the resource, and profits, TI, will 
be Px - F. If the firm decides not to drill, further profits are zero. 
When no information is available, the expected profits of 






Consider, however, the situation when information is 
(1) 
available to the firm (it will be assumed that the firm knows h(s) 
and g(xls)). In this case, the firm observes s before deciding 
whether to set K equal to 0 or 1. Therefore, the expected profits 
for the firm with information can be written as expression (2). 
J max f
00 
(n(x,K)g(x!s)dx) h(s)ds (2) 
S KidO,l} 0 
The value of information to this form is precisely (2) - (1). To 








Comparing this with (2) it is clear that the information expands the 
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choices available to the firm; it is always free with the information 
to act as before, but it is provided with new opportunities to 
optimize. 
There is a special case of the above derivation which 
is of interest: the case of perfect information. The case of 
nondiscrete outcomes will be derived here. Calculating the value of 
perfect information may be useful in that it provides an upper bound 
on the value of less than perfect information. 
With perfect information, every realization of the information 
signal, s, discloses with certainty that exactly one possible state of 
the world, x, exists. In fact, we can rescale S so that S = X, the 
possible range of x. That is, a signal s can be thought of, by 
definition, as an amount of resource. In this case, the value of 







ooo ~(x,~)f (x)dx 
Notice, however, that having received the information, 
the firm will set K = 1 (drill) for all revealed resource amounts 
x such that Px > F. Define x* as x such that Px* = F. Then, (3) 
can be rewritten as (3') if the decision of the firm without 
information is K = 1 (drill anyway) and as (3") if without information 
the tract would not have been developed (K = 0). (The general 
combination of the two cases is given by (3"').) 
f
00 
TI(x,l)f(x)dx - f~ TI(x,l)f(x)dx, if ~ 
x* 
1 (3 I) 
(3) 
fro TI(x,l)f(x)dx x* 
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if~= 0 




The value of perfect information in the particular model 
of this section can be expressed in an even more revealing way 
in expression (4) (when~= 1) and expression 5 (when~= O). 
- Jx*(Px - F)f(x)dx ~ 0 by definition 
0 




Expression (4) represents the expected savings from not 
drilling an otherwise unprofitable tract. Expression (5) represents 
the expected profits from drilling a profitable structure which, without 
the information, would have been passed over. 
In evaluating one information source, however, there is the 
possibility that it will not be the only information available for 
purchase by the firms. In terms of this model, it is necessary to 
consider cases in which J > 2. 
To capture these new difficulties, an example incorporating 
two sources of information will be presented. As will become apparent, 
the extension to more than two sources poses no conceptual problems but 
is certainly extremely messy. Consider a world in which the competitive 






. As before, the value of another information source, I
0
, will 
be defined as the change in expected profits due to its availability, 
but with the first information source available in both cases. As will 
be shown, the information I 0 is valuable not only because it provides 
information about the resource, but also because it provides new 
information on which to evaluate the purchase of the first information. 
There is the possibility that without the new information, I
1 
is 
purchased, yet after having observed the information from I
0
, the firm 
chooses to forego buying I
1
, and hence c
1
• As Short (1977] noted in 
an earlier evaluation of the Landsat program by a U.S. oil company, 
"Major savings in the initial (reconnaissance) stages of exploration 
are indicated and further savings are suggested for later stages: for 
example, a reduction in the number of seismic lines that might otherwise 
have been planned." There is also the possibility that the 
information I
0 
will lead the firm to purchase r
1 
in situations in which 
r
1 
would not otherwise be bought. These two possibilities merit a 
formal examination. 
In defining analytically the value of information I
0 
(again assumed to be utilized before existing information r
1
), the 
following definitions will be helpful: 
so is a signal from IO; it is a random variable 
sl is a signal from r1 ; it is a random variable 
So is the range of so 




,s0) is the joint p.d.f. of x, s 1 , s0 
f(x) is the marginal probability of x 
r(xJs
1
) is the conditional probability of x on s1 
g(xJs
0





) is the conditional probability of x given both 
s
1 





) is the conditional probability of s1 given s0 
h(s
0
) is the marginal probability of s0 
t(s1) is the marginal probability of s 1
• 
As was stated above, an important feature of r0 will 
be that after the firm receives s 0 , it may then perform a new 
calculus to determine whether to purchase r
1 
at cost c1 • 
Therefore, define the following two subsets of s0 , 
nl and no, as follows: 
n1 = {s0 Jadditional value of r1 (given s0) ~ c1 } 
n
0 
= {s0 J additional value of r1 (given s0) < c1} 




, it will proceed to buy some 
r1 information; otherwise, it will skip r1 and go directly to the 
next choice, optimal K. Using the notation just developed, the 




+ f max J
00 
n(x,K)g(xls0)dx h(s0)ds0 
~ KdO,l} 0 
- max{[J max J
00 
TI(x,K)r(xls1)dx t(s1)ds1 - c1] , s
1 
KdO,l} 0 
max J n(x,K)f(x)dx} (6) 
KdO,l} 0 
Expression (6) consists of three terms. The first two define 
the expected value of the resource with I 0 • The last term is the 
value of the resource without I 0 (which is the greater of the values 
when I
1 
is and is not purchased given that I 0 is unavailable). 
An interesting special question to pursue at this point is 
the following: if I 1 would be purchased absent~ under what conditions 
is n0 # ¢; that is, when will public provision of IO provide a 
cost saving by eliminating otherwise purchased I 1 ? 
By definition, the requirement is that there exists some 
The following theorem provides an intuitive sufficient condition for 
this to hold, but demonstrates that it is not necessary. 
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Theorem 1 
To insure that public provision of I
0 
eliminates all social 
value to purchasing I
1 
regardless of the cost, c
1
. The following is 
sufficient but not necessary: 
II 
The proof of the Theorem is contained in the Appendix. In 
general, Theorem 1 says that I 0 will eliminate all social value for the 
purchase of Il when I is "better" than 0 
I
1 
in that receiving s 1 in 
addition to so does not add anything to one's knowledge about the 
probability of x. An interesting special case is that in which s 0 
reveals with certainty the true value of s 1 . 
As was mentioned previously, even with only two types 
of information, expression (6) is rather complicated. The same 
conceptual argument applies when J > 3 types of information are 
available, but deriving the expression grows even more cumbersome. 
The important point is that the new information not only may have 
value on its own but may also provide gains from an optimal 
readjustment of the purchase of other categories of information 
already available. 
Two simple, discrete probability examples of the two category 
case should be useful. These examples demonstrate that if the marginal 
value calculations of I 0 are made assuming ~ changes in the purchase 
of I 1 , then these valuations of I 0 
are incorrect. 
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Example III-I': Without I 0 , I 1 
is purchased. 
Let there be four possible states of the world, each occurring with 
probability 1/4: 0 pounds of ore, 1/2 pound of ore, 3/4 pound of 
ore, 4.75 pounds of ore. The price of ore is $2/pound, and the fixed 
development costs are $2. There is initially available, at a cost 
of $.20, perfect information I 1 , over the states of the world. With 
no information at all, the value of the tract is 
1/4($0) + 1/4($1) + 1/4($1.5) + 1/4($9.50) - $2 = $1. 
With the information I 1 , at a cost of $.20, the value of the tract 
is 
3/4 ($0) + 1/4 ($7.50) - $.20 = $1.675, 
so I
1 
would be purchased. Next, suppose that the firm is offered 
free information I 0 which, with certainty, separates the tract into 
a worse category (0 pounds or 1/2 pound) or a better category 3/4 
pound or 4.75 pounds). Note that, since I 0 adds no new information 
if I
1 
is at hand, I
0 
will always be considered first by the firm. 
If the signal from 10 , s0
, says that the tract is bad 
(O pounds or 1/2 pound), the gross additional value of r1 is 
[1/2(0) + 1/2(0)] = (O) = $0, 
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which is less than $.20, so the perfect information, I
1
, would 
not be bought. In terms of the formal model, an I 0 signal of 
"bad" is an element of no. 
However, if the I 0 signal says that the tract is good, 
(3/4 pound or 4.75 pounds), the gross additional value of I
1 
is 
[l/2(0) + 1/2($7.50)] - [1/2($1.50) + 1/2($9.50) - $2] 
= $3.75 - $3.50 = $.75 
which is more than $.20, so the perfect information would be bought. 
Again, in terms of the formal model, a "good" signal from I 0 is an 
element of nl. 
Therefore, the total value of the tract, with both I 0 
and I 1 available is 
l/2[$0] + l/2[1/2($7.50) + 1/2($0) - $.20] = $1.775 




is available is $.10. 
As was noted above, if the marginal value calculation of IO had 
assumed that there would be no changes in the purchases of I
1
, 
the marginal additional value of I 0 would have been incorrectly 
calculated as zero. 
Example III-2: Without I 0
, I 1 is not purchased. 
Again, let there be four possible states of the world, each occurring 
with probability 1/4: 0 pounds of ore, 1/4 pound of ore, 3/4 pound 
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of ore, 1 pound of ore. 
Ore sells for $1 per pound, and ex ante fixed development 
costs are $.40. 
There is initially available, at a cost of $.15, information, 
I
1
, which correctly separates the states of the world into two 
possible categories 
(1 lb, 3/4 lb) or (1/4 lb, 0 lbs). 
Without I 1 , the expected value of the tract is $.10. 
With I
1
, purchased at $.15, the expected value of the tract is 
1/2($0) + 1/2(1/2($.60) + 1/2($.35)) - $.15 = $.0875. 
So the information would not be purchased. 
Suppose that the firm. is offered free information, 
I 0 , which correctly separates the tract into the following two 
categories 
(1,1/4) or (0,3/4). 
Suppose the realization of I 0, s0 , is that x E (0,3/4). With no 
further information, the expected value of the tract is zero; 
however, the expected value of the tract (given that x E (0,3/4) 
with the purchase of I 1 at $.15 is 
1/2($0) + 1/2($.35) - $.15 = $.025. 
So, at $.15 the information will be purchased. 
Although it may appear strange that r
0 
separates (1,1/4) from 
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(0,3/4), the example is not far-fetched. Consider the case of a geologic 
structure described by two characteristics, a and S. (For example, in 
petroleum exploration there are characteristics such as type of structure, 
faulting, porosity, permeability, etc.). Suppose information about 
each characteristic can be either favorable(+) or unfavorable(-). 
A return matrix for the four combinations could look like Figure 1. 
In the particular example in this section, a and S would be independent 
variables each with equal likelihood of producing a positive or negative 
signal. In such an example, I 1 distinguishes favorable from unfavorable 
on the S characteristic, while I
0 
does the same for the a characteristic. 
IV. THE PRIVATE VALUE OF INFORMATION 
The previous section has dealt with an idealized competitive 
market in which all gains to the competitive firm also represent 
a gain to society. Hirshleifer [1971] has demonstrated 
that even when markets are competitive, the value of private 
information can be independent of the social value of the information. 
Even in a world in which the social value of information (as 
defined by (2) - (1) in section III) is zero, any one firm 
or individual might benefit from private knowledge of the true 
state of the world. Such information, although not increasing 
the total wealth of society, could allow an individual or firm to 
take advantage of less knowledgeable agents. A familiar, everyday 
example (from Montgomery and Quirk [1974]) is the case of horse race 
gambling: the total well-being of society will probably be little 





+ 1 1/4 
3/4 0 
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bettors are individually willing to spend a considerable amount 
on "inside information" from the paddock. 
Hirshleifer's arguments for redistributional effects of 
information were originally couched in terms of the competitive 
market. Since his work, other authors have shown that particular 
"real world" resource allocation institutions create an environment 
for smaller private incentives for redistributional gain. One 
of the most notable institutions so examined involves a natural 
resource: the competitive sealed bid auctions for offshore U.S. 
oil leases (see especially Wilson [1967], Hughart [1975] and Reece 
[1978]. A more detailed overview of these articles is contained in 
Chapter 1). The sealed bidding institution can foster incentives 
for individual firms to purchase information even when such information 
is not socially valuable (in the sense that ex ante fixed cost 
decisions can be affected by the availability of the information, as 
was described in section III). 
An example of the incentives for private information 
purchase in a model which incorporates sealed bidding and fixed 
cost drilling technology will be developed in this section. Because 
information can be made available in contexts besides the auction 
procedure adopted by the U.S. for offshore oil drilling, in this 
section two other conceivable "real world" institutions also will be 
considered: 
i) face to face bargaining with a preselected firm; and 
ii) noncompetitive leasing. 
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Competitive Sealed Bid Auctions 
Hughart [1975] demonstrated a model in which even when 
information is socially valueless, firms participating in a 
competitive sealed bid leasing program can have private incentives 
to purchase information. Here it will be demonstrated that 
analogous results still hold when fixed production costs and socially 
valuable information are introduced. The following assumptions 
are from Hughart's work: 
1) There are two risk neutral firms A-Co. and B-Co. 
2) There are N tracts of land to be leased separately in 
N sealed bids, competitive auctions. Before any information 
is available, both firms agree that, with probability 
g, a given tract is "good" (it contains XG resources) and 
and with probability (1 - g) it is "poor" (it contains 
~resources). Call the price of_ the resource P. 
Unlike in Hughart's model, suppose that there is a 
fixed drilling cost, F. The following additional assumptions will 
be utilized here: 
3) The expected amount of resources on a given tract is ~ 
= g(XG) + (1 - g)~ 
4) p • ~ = F, so that with no information, each tract 
would be just marginal. 
5) P · ~ < F, so that a tract known to be "poor" will not 
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be developed, and prior perfect information is socially 
valuable in the amount (1 -·g)(P~ - F). · 
6) Both firms know g, XG, ~' P. 
Now, suppose that A-Co. has private access to the 
prior, perfect information. Unlike in Hughart's model, information 
is not directly about the value of the tract; rather, information is 
obtained on the physical characteristics, XG or ~' of the tract. 
In fact, the expected value of any tract is ex ante higher for 
A-Co. than for B-Co. 
First, note that the assumed information asyrrnnetry will 
be maintained by A-Co. If A-Co. gives the perfect information to 
B-Co., the resulting equilibrium outcome will result in each firm 
receiving zero profits, as each bids zero on the poor tracts and bids 
(q · XG - F) on the good tracts. If A-Co. keeps the information private. 
it knows that B-Co, can never bid any positi"lre amount for either tract 
because B-Co. would then only win the valueless properties. A-Co. can 
guarantee itself a strictly positive expected profit, while B, at best 
breaks even. 3 
The penalties of being ill informed and the profits 
of being the best informed provide an incentive for each firm, 
if given the opportunity, to purchase the private information 
(and not transfer it at marginal reproduction cost) •. From 
society's poi~t of view, this is an overinvestment in private 
information, a waste of resources. 
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Direct Negotiations with a Pre-chosen Firm 
Consider a country, B, which has chosen to distribute 
its mineral leases via face to face negotiation with a preselected 
firm, A. Assume that both are risk neutral, and that there 
exist two possible states of the world, each with probability 1/2 
(recognized by both parties). 
xl = 1,000,000 pounds/ore 
x2 = 10,000,000 pounds/ore 
It will be assumed that all ore is sold in one year at 
a net price of $20/pound. In this example, suppose that there are 
no fixed costs of production, so information is "socially valueless" 
in the sense of section III. The question to be explored here is 
whether firm A will find information privately valuable. 
The total of expected profits from this resource is 
1/2 ( $20 million) + 1/2 ( $200 million) = •$110 million 
Suppose that, after face to face negotiations, the government of 
B and firm A agree that B will receive expected profits of $65 million, 
payable either in a resource payment or in royalties on the 
remainder not given as resource payment. (A resource payment is an 
agreement in which the first "y" pounds of production, where "y" 
is a prearranged amount, is given directly to the leaseholder.) With 
no further information, A's expected profits are $45 million. 
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Suppose that A were offered perfect, private information about 
the resource X. How would this affect A's profits? 
If A knows before hand that x
1 
(X = 1,000,000 pounds of ore) 
will occur, he can offer B a payment schedule with no resource payment 
and a royalty of 13/22 of the output. B will be satisfied, as this 
plan's expected profits are 
1/2(13/22 x $20 million) + 1/2(13/22 x $200 million) = $65 million. 
A's sure return, knowing that Xi will occur, is 
9/22 x $20,000,000 = $8.1818 million. 
On the other hand, if A knows that x2 will occur, he can 
offer B a resource payment of one million pounds and a royalty of 
one half of the remainder of the output. Again, B views its 
expected profits as: 
1/2($20 million) + 1/2($20 million+ 1/2($180 million)) = $65 million 
while A knows that its profits will be 
1/2($180 million) = $90 million. 
Therefore, the expected profits for A operating from a full information 
position are 
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1/2($8.1818 million) + 1/2($90 million) = $49.0909 million 
That is, perfect information has a value to A_of $4.0909 million. 
A would do well to spend up to this amount to achieve an expected 
redistributive gain. From the view of increasing the total 
expected profits of the economy, such expenditures are wasteful. 
With no fixed costs of production, the same production decision (to 
open the mine) will be made regardless of the outcome of the effort 
to acquire information. 4 
Lottery with an Af termarket 
The United States Department of Interior's Bureau of 
Land Management is authorized to award prospecting permits (which 
carry a preference right for leasing) on a first come, first served 
basis.5 In practice, a public deadline is set, and all applications 
received are considered to be simultaneously submitted. The 
winner is then chosen by a public drawing. The preference right 
leases may be transferred, so in theory (and apparently in practice) 6 
there is an aftermarket for them. 
This section will concentrate on the lottery feature of 
this institution. Oi:lce the leases are awarded, the further potential 
value of information, public or private, will depend upon how the 
market is organized. The previous examples (competitive, bidding, 
direct negotiation) could easily be applied to the aftermarket. Its 
role as a secondary market causes no major analytical problems. 
So, consider just the lottery part of the situation. Let X 
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be a lease for which applications are being accepted (for purposes 
of this paper, the original prospectus permit and the subsequent 
preference lease right will be considered as one). Suppose that 
1) There are N risk neutral potential bidders 
2) There are two possible states of the world, which each 
bidder believes will occur with probability 1/2: 
xl = ~ lbs/ore 
x2 = XG lbs/ore, XG > ~ 
3) Ore sells for $q/lb; all ore will be sold the first year 
4) There are fixed costs of production of $F 
5) qX1 - F < O, so information is socially valuable 
6) There are no costs of participating in the lottery 
7) The winner of the lottery may costlessly forfeit if 
desired. 
The winner of the lottery will consider purchasing the 
valuable information in order to increase expected profits. However, 
the outcome of the lottery is itself a random event. Knowledge 
about the true state of X does not change the probability of winning 
for any participant, nor does it offer any possible reduction in 
costs from the lottery itself. Therefore, none of the individuals 
will value any private information before the lottery and the lottery 
per se induces no wasteful purchase of information. 
If Assumption 6 or 7 is modified so that participating 
6 in the lottery entails a fixed cost, or if the winner is subject 
41 
to fees which are unavoidable by forfeiture, then each participant 
can value private information which allows him to avoid auction costs 
or lease fees on bad tracts. 
V. PRIVATE INFORMATION PURCHASE AND THE VALUE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION 
In situations in which more than one firm finds that 
there is a private value of information, the resulting individual 
firm decisions on information purchase can be viewed initially as 
an N-person, noncooperative game. In this section, it will be 
shown that, in many situations, the resulting model will be a classic 
prisoner's dilemma. Each firm buys the private information, yet 
when all firms are purchasers, each firm is worse off than if none 
bought. 
In section III, it was shown that among the benefits of 
public information is the possibility of making otherwise scheduled 
information purchase unnecessary. There is a similar principle which 
applies to private information. Publicly provided information may 
have benefits beyond its own direct social value if its dissemina-
tion eliminates the waste of resources which otherwise would have 
occurred through overinvestment in private information for 
redistributive gain. Thus, public (i.e., government) information 
gathering and announcement are often recommended as a means of 
eliminating wasteful private duplication (Hughart 1975). In 
this section, publicly provided information will be examined along 
with another possible remedy, cooperative information gathering. It 
will be shown that each has drawbacks. Specifically, however, it 
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will be demonstrated that public information provision not only 
may fail to alleviate private overinvestment, it may actually 
make matters worse.9 
Consider a world consisting of precisely two firms. 
Because :the world consists of only these two firms, define "social 
well-being" to be the sum of the firms profits. When information 
has no social value, the maximum expected joint profits of the 
firms are not increased by information. If obtaining the information 
represents a cost to the society of C > O, then maximum social well-
being requires that C not be purchased. However, when it is the 
case that a privately informed firm gains some redistributive 
benefit y* > C from an ill-informed firm, there is the possibility 
of private incentives to purchase information. (It will be assumed 
that if both firms are informed, no redistribution occurs.) These 
assumptions can be represented by a 2-person game in normal form 
(Figure 2), in which the entries are profits (represented as changes 
from the don't buy/don't buy social optimum). The noncooperative 
dominant strategy equilibrium is (buy, buy) which is strictly 
Pareto dominated by (don't buy, don't buy), a classic prisoner's 
dilemma situation. 
If cooperative behavior is allowed, no joint information 
gathering will occur, for the maximum expected joint payoffs occur 
when no information at all is purchased. The only efficient 
cooperative behavior is some type of binding agreement th~t prevents 
either firm from gathering information. 











Don't buy info Buy info 
o, 0 -y*, y* - c 
y* - c, -y* -c, -c 
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then there is no longer any incentive for further overinvestment 
in that particular private information. In fact, public information 
which is "better" in the sense of Theorem 1 in section III will, by 
a proof identical to that of Theorem 1, eliminate that particular 
private incentive to overinvestment. Thus, the "social maximizer" 
attempting to maximize the joint expected profits of the firms, would 
consider two policies: i) an institution which prevents any infor-
mation gathering at all (at some cost Cs1); or ii) public information 
provision (at some cost cs
2
). Neither policy is valuable in and 
of itself, but each may prevent the waste of resources, 2C, on 
private information. 
Next, consider a case in which the information is 
socially valuable in that it increases joint expected profits by 
w > C. Of course, if both firms privately purchase the information 
at cost C, resources are wasted. Assume that if one firm is perfectly 
informed, while the other is not, the informed firm obtains all the 
social benefits, w, plus some net redistributive transfer u > 0. If 
-
both firms are perfectly informed, each receives some share, a or S, 
of w, where a+ S _:::. 1. Then, assuming aw - C > 0 and Sw - C > 0, 
the game matrix can be represented by Figure 3. 
Again, when-aw - c ~ -y, overinvestment in information is 
still the dominant strategy equilibrium with total payoffs (a + S)w - 2C. 
In this case, however, optimal joint expected profits can be achieved 
by voluntary, cooperative information gathering by the firms, as 
the social optimum is not (don't buy, don't buy) but rather either 
(don't buy, buy) or (buy, don't buy), with payoffs (w - C). 




Don't buy Buy 
Don't 0, 0 -y, w+y- c 
FIRM buy 
A 
w + y - c, -.Y aw - c, Bw - c 
Buy 
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Providing better public information also eliminates the incentives 
for private information purchase. 
A strong caveat is in order at this point. The assumption 
of a society of only two firms excludes the case of efficiency losses 
from cartel behavior by the two firms, or a redistribution away 
from other parties. In a world of more than two firm~ competitive 
behavior would require that cooperation be limited strictly to 
the process of gathering information. The extent to which 
firms can cooperate on information gathering and not be able to 
collude in other aspects is an open question. 
To see the problems which potential collusion can cause, a 
third model will be presented in which there is a third, passive 
player in the game. The payoffs to the third person are a function 
solely of the actions of the two firms. As in the bidding model, 
this player might be a government holding a lease auction. It 
will be assumed that information is socially valuable (and that 
society's well-being is defined as the sum of profits to the two 
firms and to the passive third party). If neither firm is informed, 
neither makes any profits and some "uninformed" return, w, accrues 
to the third party. However, suppose that if some information is 
gathered at cost c, there is a higher level, w*, in expected 
total profits. If both firms are informed, each firm captures E 
of the informed profits, w*, and the third party receives w*(l - 2E). 
(It will be assumed that 1/2 > E > 0.) If only one firm is informed 
it receives a transfer y* 2:_ 0 from the other firm, as well as some 
other fraction 0 > o > 1 of the informed return, w*. It is reasonable 
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to believe that, as in the bidding model, it is better to be the 
only one informed, so let &w* + y* > 2£w*. The payoff matrix is 
presented in Figure 4, with the third entry in each cell representing 
the "third party." Overinvestment in private information will be 
a dominant strategy only when: i) if both firms are informed, each 
one's share of the total profits less the cost of purchasing the 
information is greater than the penality to being the only one 
uninformed (ew* - C .:_ -y*); and ii) if only one firm is informed, its 
redistribution from the uninformed firm plus its additional share of 
the informed total profits is greater than the cost of the information 
(Ew* + y* - C .:_ 0). 
Consider voluntary cooperative behavior on the part of 
the firms. The total of profits to the two firms is i) the 
informed firms increment from the informed total prof its less infor-
mations costs (ow* - C) when only one firm buys the information; 
ii) zero, when neither firm buys the information; or iii) the total 
of .the two firms' share in total profits, less twice the information 
costs (2£W* - 2C) when both purchase the information. If the 
share of the only informed firm in the higher level of profits is 
greater than the information costs (ow*> C), then the firms will 
find their cooperative strategy is to purchase the information once, 
then act towards the third party as though (don't buy, buy) or 
(buy, don't buy) is their strategy, and finally to arrange appropriate 
side payments. In terms of the bidding model, this means that the 
firms' cooperative behavior must include cooperative information 








ow*+ y* - c, 
-y* 





-y*, ow*+ y* - c 
( [1 - o]w*) 
e:w* - c,e:w* - c 
( [1 - 2£]w*) 
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would occur in the (don't buy, buy) or (buy, don't buy) noncooperative 
case. If the firms jointly purchase information but bid competitively 
against each other on the basis of that information, the returns 
are (Ew* - C/2) to each firm and ({l - 2E]w*) to the government. 
If the firms are constrained in their possible cooperation 
so that only cooperative information gathering (not collusive bidding 
strategies) is allowed, then each would prefer that outcome 
(8w* - C/2,Ew* - C/2) to the result of double purchase (Ew* - C, 
Ew* - C), although each could still prefer (O,O) where each firm 
is prevented from purchasing any information at all. Once again, 
if "better" public information is provided, the incentives for 
prlvate purchase of the information disappear. 
In the preceding three models, the prescription for 
publicly provided information might appear to be rather robust: 
the models let the private information be socially valueless or 
valuable, and passive third parties do not affect the result. 
For these conclusions to hold, the provision that the public informa-
tion be "better" than the private is crucial, as the following 
examples demonstrate. 
Example V-1: In the following, publicly provided information fails 
to eliminate a strictly positive incentive for overinvestment in 
private information of another kind. · 
Let X be an ore deposit. Let there be four possible 
states of the world, each occurring with probability 1/4: 
xl = 0 tons 
x2 = 1 ton 
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x3 = 2 tons 
x4 = 4 tons 
Assume that there are N risk neutral firms, each of which 
shares the above subjective probability over outcomes, and each of 
which is endowed with a l/N share of ownership of the ore depost. 
Each of the N firms will buy or sell shares in the deposit for the 
perceived expected value. For purposes of this illustrative example, 
suppose N = 2, and consider the following further assumptions: 
i) ore sells for $1/ton 
ii) there are no fixed extraction costs; public information 
has no social value. 
Suppose that there is available for private purchase 
at $.10 perfect information over the true state of the world. Each 
firm will calculate the value of that private information as follows: 
with no information at all, the expected value of a 1/2 share in 
the venture is $.875. On the other hand, the firm must examine 
its optimal strategy with private, perfect information. If x
1 
or x2 is known, the informed firm can increase its profits by 
selling its l/2share to the uninformed firm at $.8750. If x
3 
or x4 is known, then the informed firm can increase its profits 
by buying out the partner at $.8750. Therefore, the informed 
firms expected profits are 
1/2($.875) + 1/4($2 - .875) + 1/4($4 - .875) = $1.50 
51 
The gross value of the information, $.625, is greater than its cost, 
so the information has a net positive value. Similar calculations 
will show that the expected return from being uninformed is $.25, 
creating a prisoner's dilemma type situation that leads to informa-
tion overinvestment. See Figure 5. 
Suppose that "the government" distributes, free of charge, 
public information which would correctly separate the world into 
two possibilities {x1 , x2 } or {x3 ,x4}. If the public information 
narrows the possibilities to {X1 ,x2}, and there is no further 
information, the expected half-share payoff is: 
1/2(1/2(0) + 1/2(1)) = $.25. 
If a firm has the private information, the expected gross return 
is (using similar calculations) $.50. Again, the gross value of the 
information exceeds the cost, $.10. The return to being the only one 
uninformed is zero, so overinvestment in the private information 





} is the revealed pair, the expected payoff chart can be 
represented by Figure 7. Despite the public purchase of the first 
information package, the dominant strategy equilibrium is to overinvest 
in the perfect private information. Therefore, the "government" 
has invested some C* in public information, yet has not caused any 
reduction in private investment in information. 
One key feature of the previous example is that the 
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public information does not. Of course one could construct 
intermediate cases in which public information of one type 
eliminates some but not all overinvestment in other private 
information. The other key feature is the pattern of states-of-the-
world which the public information will differentiate. 
This example suggests that existing private overinvestment 
can remain unchecked by publicly provided information. In fact, the 
results can be even worse. In some cases providing some (imperfect) 
public information can create incentives for wasteful private over-
investment. This observation follows directly from example III-2, in 
which the presence of one type of information can increase the value 
of another. 
Example V-2: A case "in which publicly provided information creates 
incentives for later private overinvestment. 
To see this point, consider a situation similar to the 
preceding example: let there be two firms sharing in a venture with 
four possible outcomes: 
xl = 0 tons 
X = .45 tons 
2 
x3 = .6 tons 
x4 = .65 tons 
each occurring with probability 1/4. Again assume that 
i) ore sells for $1/ton 
ii) there are no extraction costs; public information has no 
social value. 
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Each firm will buy and sell shares in the venture for 
the perceived expected value. What each firm must decide is 
whether or not to purchase, at a cost of $.12, information which 
correctly separates the world into two categories: {0,.45} or 
{.6,.65}. Without such information, 1/2 of the expected value of 
the tract is 
1/2(1/4(0 + $.45 + $.60 + $.65)) = $.2125. 
With the information, the gross value of the tract is 
1/2($.2125) + 1/2($.625 - $.2125) = $.3125 
So, the gross value of the information is $.10 and it would not 
be purchased. 
Suppose that public information is released which 
correctly reveals that the true state of the world is either 
{O or .6} tons. Now, 1/2 of the expected value of the venture 
is $.15. However, with private information which correctly inden-
tifies {0,.45} or {.60,.65}, the gross value of the tract is 
l/2{.15} + 1/2{.6 - .15} = $.30 
That is, after the public information is released, there 
is increased private overinvestment, as a prisoner's dilemma 
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Thus, when the public information is not perfect, not 
only may it not work as a remedy to private overinvestment, it may 
actually generate more wasteful duplicate private purchase than 
would otherwise have occurred. 
These two examples demonstrate that it is not a general 
proposition that publicly provided information will eliminate private 
overinvestment in information. 
The examples do not themselves indicate any general guide~ 
lines for anticipating the "perverse" result that even more private 
investment can result. 
It was noted earlier in this section that when public infor-
mation is better (in the sense of Theorem 1) than the private informa-
tion, private overinvestment will be eliminated. , When this condition 
is not true, the results are ambiguous. The following theorem, 
proved in the Appendix, provides necessary but not sufficient conditions 
for public information never to create incentives for private invest-
ment where none otherwise existed. 
Theorem 2 
Suppose there are two tirms and two types of information: 
i) I 1 is available for private purchase, and ii) I 0 which the 
government is considering providing publicly, with s being a parti-
cular realization of the signal from I • Define the following: 
0 
v; is the expected gross to one firm if neither purchases 
I 1 , if s is observed from I 0 v: is the expected gross return to the only firm purchasing 
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I 1 if s is observed from I 0 
v8 Is the expected gross return to the only firm not 
purchasing I
1 
if s is observed from I
0
• 
v: is the expected gross return to one firm if both purchase 
I 1 , if s is observed from I 0 • 
C is the cost of purchasing I. 
The following two conditions are jointly necessary but 
not sufficient to insure that it is always a dominant strategy not to 
privately purchase I
1 







> E(Vs) - C 
+ 
> E(v:) - C 0 
this theorem says that to insure that no private incen-
tives for overinvestment occur for any realization of the public 
information, it must be true for each firm that the expected returns 
from purchasing the informati~n must be less than or equal to the 
expected returns without the information regardless of the actions 
of the other firm. Even if this condition holds, "perverse" results 
can still occur at some realizations of I , the public information. 
0 
When a prisoner's dilemma (such as has been modelled in 
this section) exists, firms realize that if they are market 
participants, their dominant strategy will be to purchase .private 
information. The structure of incentives, therefore, creates a 
fixed cost to potential resource extraction firms. As fixed costs 
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can pose barriers to entry, the incentives for private overinvestment 
may have the side effect of making the market less competitive 
than otherwise. Unfortunately, since public information provision 
may allow for more, less, or the same expenditures on subsequent 
private information purchases, the net effect of the public information 
on the resulting market structure is ambiguous. 
The partial equilibrium approach utilized in the examples 
in this section may overstate the potential for private overinvestment 
compared to a general equilibrium appraoch. As Montgomery and 
Quirk [1974] have pointed out, the informed firm which attempts to 
obtain financing for its transactions in imperfect capital markets 
may be required to divulge the results of the private information 
to the source of funds. The extent to which natural resource firms 
actually face this problem in exploration or pre-auction capital 
transactions is not explored here. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Information can be a valuable commodity in natural resource 
exploration, even to the risk neutral firm. It is clear that natural 
resource firms recognize and procure many types of exploratory 
information. Such a multi-source information decision problem can 
be modelled, and the resulting value of information defined. Such 
a calculus necessarily takes account of the effects of one type of 
information on the optimal purchase of other types. 
The valuation of information by private firms may differ 
from that of society in that private purchasers may value information 
60 
in order to obtain strictly redistributional gains. This has been 
a particular concern with regard to the auctioning of off shore 
oil leases. In sections IV and V of this paper, it was noted that, 
while the role of information may differ in contexts other than 
competitive auctions for oil leases, the problem is not unique 
to auctioning among real world allocation processes. 
Public information provision has been suggested as a remedy 
for private incentives to overinvest in information. It was shown 
that, while public information may in some cases eliminate private 
overinvestment, this is not a general result if the public informa-
tion is not better than the private. Unfortunately, it is not 
realistic to believe that a government can release perfect natural 
resource information, so the problems of overinvestment remain. As 
an aerial photograph would not reveal with certainty the presence of 
oil, the potential would exist for further private investment in 
other types of information, such as seismic or magnetic surveys, 
even with publicly provided information. 
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APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2 
Proof of Theorem 1 
Again, the theorem states that 
is sufficient but not necessary to insure that I 0 eliminates 
all value to I 1 • Note that if public provision of I 0 eliminates 
the further incentive to ·purchase I 1 when c1 = 0, it certainly 
eliminates that incentive if c1 > O. Therefore, consider the 
case of the expected profits from having I 1 (given that I 0 has 
been revealed to be S~) when the cost of I 1 = 0, These expected 
profits are given by expression (A-1). 
max 
K 
By the condition of the theorem, one need consider only 
(A-1) 
s1 £ {s1 lq(s1 ls~) > O}. Call this s~t S. Then (A-1) becomes (A-2). 
(A-2) 
Again using the condition, one can substitute g(xjs~) fo.r p(xl's1 ,s~) 
and obtain (A-3). 
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(A-3) 
But the middle part of (A-3) is independent of s 1 , and so can be 
brought outside the integral sign to give (A-4). 
Expression (A-4) is precisely the value of expected 
profits without purchasing any additional information 11 • Since 
11 has not increased expected prpfits at all, it is valueless. 
The choice of s~ was arbitrary, so the result holds regardless 
of the outcome of information 10 . 
(A-4) 
To see that the condition in the theorem is not necessary, 
consider the following example: 
Let X take on, with equal (1/4) probability, one of four 
states 
x = 0 
1 
pounds/ore 
X2 = 1 pound/ore 
x3 = 19 pounds/ore 
X4 = 20 pounds/ore 
Suppose ore sells for $1/pound, and that fixed mining 
costs are $10. Let 1
1 
be perfect, sure information about the true 
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state of X. Let I 0
·correctly separate the world into two categories: 
Good: x = {X3 or X4} 
Bad: x = {Xl or X2} 
Simple calculations will show that regardless of the 
cost of I 1 , there is no value to purchasing it after I 0 is 
provided. Yet, the condition of the theorem is violated. 
Proof of Theorem 2 
For each realization s of the public information I
0
, 
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for the realization s, "Don't Buy" is a dominant 
the following two conditions must hold: 
and 
It follows that if "Don't Buy" is a dominant strategy for all 
(A-5) 
(A-6) 
realizations of the public information, I
0
, then the expectations 
of the expressions (A-5) and (A-6) must yield the same inequalities: 
E(V~) :: 
E(V~) :: 
E(V:) - c 




To see that (A-7) and (A-8) are not sufficient conditions, 
consider Example V-2. Had the public information revealed instead 
that one of · {.45 or .65} . was the true state of the world, then the 
payoff matrix for the private information problem would be as 
follows: 
FIRM B 
Don't Buy Buy 
Don't Buy .275, .275 .225, .205 
FIRM A 
Buy .205, .225 .155' .155 
Not purchasing the private information is a joint 
dominant strategy equilibrium. Yet, combining this result with 
the similar numbers from figure 8, the following relationships 
obtain: 
E(V:) = .2125 :: .1925 = E(V:) - c 
E(V~) .1125 :: .0925 = E(V~) - c 
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The two necessary conditions of the theorem hold, yet Example V-2 
demonstrates that private investment incentives are created at 
one realization of the public information. 
66 
FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER 2 
1. The problem can be elaborated to allow the firm to choose 
the most profitable from among the J! possible sequences of J 
types of information. 
2. It is assumed that all firms' probabilistic expectations over 
the information are consistent with their expectations directly 
over the states of the world. That is, if a firm believes 
that (with probability 1/2) X = 0, and (with probability 1/2) 
X = 1, then it must also believe that perfect information 
about X will reveal X = 0 and X = 1 each with probability 1/2. 
This approach to the value of information involves 
ex ante optimization. For a discussion of the distinction 
between ex ante and ex post optimality, see Starr 1'197 3 } 
3. In this special example, the equilibrium concept which is used 
is the Nash equilibrium. For example, when both firms are 
informed the following strategy 
( P • XG - F) on good tracts 
No bid on poor tracts 
when used by each firm is a Nash equilibrium. Likewise, when 
A-Co. alone is privately informed, the following bidding· 
strategy is a Nash equilibrium 
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for A-Co.: 0 on good tracts; No bids on bad 
B-Co.: No bids at all 
Expected profits A-Co. = Ng( P • XG - F) 
Expected profits B-Co. = 0 
Hughart's model incorporates a slightly more complicated 
leader/follower equilibrium. This is explained more fully in 
Chapter 1. Hughart's assumption of common knowledge by all 
firms of the other assumptions is maintained. 
4. This example shows that private overinvestment incentives 
occur even outside a system of sealed bidding for oil leases. 
It is not design~d to be a definitive description of such a 
bargaining problem, which could have strategic behavior on 
both sides at many levels. 
5. 43 C.F.R. §3511 and 43 C.F.R. §3520 
6. 43 C.F.R. §3506 and Oil and Gas Journal, Vol. 77 No. 24, 
June 11, 1979, pp. 34-35. 
7. According to the Oil and Gas Journal (op. cit.) the filing 
fee for noncompetitive leasing onshore is $10. In addition, 
there is a $1/year lease rental fee. 
8. The approach taken in this chapter draws upon insight from 
Ferejohn and Noll [1978]. 
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CHAPTER 3 
COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONS FOR 
INFORMATION SHARING IN THE OIL INDUSTRY 
I. INTRODDCTION 
Finding and producing petroleum is an inherently risky 
undertaking. In such an environment of uncertainty, information 
can be a valuable commodity.1 There are several ways in which 
an oil firm can obtain information about a prospect. There are 
well defined markets in which certain scientific measurements or 
records can be obtained (aerial photographs, seismic surveys, the 
labor market for geologists and geophysicists,_etc::..). But 
it is also true that the actual drilling, logging, coring, and 
producing from a subsurface structure can provide information. 2 
An important feature of petroleum exploration and develop-
ment is that information obtained about one geological feature is 
often useful outside of a particular drilling site. Such infor-
mation can give a better picture not only of a portion of a poten-
tial stratum but also of the entire reservoir and even of entirely 
separate prospects with similar geological features. Thus, there 
are many opportunities for an oil company, through its own infor-
mation gathering procedures, to obtain information valuable to 
others. In this respect, as .i:. one ... 1rm, X, has a commodity (information) 
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which another firm, Y, values, there is the possibility of mutually 
beneficial exchange. Oil field information often also has the 
property of "non-excludability" in which one firm is unable to 
prevent another firm from sharing in the valuable information if 
they do not agree upon terms of exchange. 
Information is thus often a public good. For example, 
while a firm may be able to keep the results per se of a seismic 
survey private, if the firm acts upon the information in some 
particular way, say, by commencing drilling on a wildcat prospect, 
the firm may "tip off" others. 3 Likewise, the results of completed 
test drilling may not easily be kept secret. It is typically 
observed that successful discoveries on one lease will drive up 
the value of surrounding acreage. 4 This is an indication that the 
first discovering oil firm, if it does not already own all the 
relevant adjacent acreage, is giving away valuable information to 
others. In fact, the mere initiation of drilling activity on land 
previously thought to be worthless should increase the value of 
the mineral rights of surrounding land by the capitalized value of 
the information. In these cases, surrounding lease owners are in 
the position of being "free riders" off the first person to begin 
drilling. 
This paper is concerned with a special case of such infor-
mation externalities, namely those in which there is more than 
one firm owning "informationally related" prospects and in which 
each firm has the opportunity to be a free rider in receiving 
information paid for by another. A simple example is depicted 
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in Figure 1. The dotted line indicates the boundaries of a 
geological formation which has two tracts, A and B; each tract 
is owned by a different firm. Suppose that drilling a well on 
either property yields valuable information about both. Furthermore, 
suppose that the information obtained through drilling is not 
excludable, so the owner of A can gain information if drilling 
takes place on B, and vice versa. If the external information flows 
are valuable, the model represents a conflict of interest which 
can be modeled in the framework of game theory. This game theoretic 
model of two firms and "nature" is essentially the one employed 
by Stiglitz Il975]. 
Using this game theoretic model, it is easy to show 
that when the conflict takes the form of a noncooperative, variable 
sum game, a suboptimal outcome can result. However, the more 
important part of this paper will be to examine the role of some 
"real world" institutions which Grayson calls "trading" arrangements 
(Grayson 11960]). These institutions will be described in more 
detail in a later section, but the essential feature which will be 
modeled here is that they transform the noncooperative game to a 
cooperative game with side payments. In some instances the existence 
of these trading arrangements allows the players to reach an optimal 
outcome. 
In an earlier paper, which does not specifically consider 
the existence of these trading institutions, Peterson argues that 
the presence of information externalities in exploration suggests 
the need for government subsidies (Peterson [1975]). 5 A similar 
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argument was made by Stiglitz (1975). To the extent that cooperative 
information sharing institutions ameliorate effects of the externality, 
the need for government assistance is no longer indicated. However, 
it will be shown in this paper that the voluntary trading arrangements 
are not a cure-all. There are circumstances in which suboptimal 
results can still occur. This paper will attempt to distinguish 
the conditions in which the private trading institutions will fail 
from those in which they will be more successful. Particular 
attention will be paid to those cases in which all firms realize 
that they will be strictly better off by playing the game cooperatively. 
When this is true, the existence of trading agreements suggests 
that their evolution is a natural or expected institutional adaptation. 
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
Referring again to Figure 1, consider a tract of land 
under which there is a geological structure S. Suppose that the 
surface projection of S (represented by the dotted line) is divided 
in terms of ownership between two different tracts, called here 
A and B,which have different owners. Because of this overlap, it 
will be assumed that the two tracts are informationally related
6 
and that each owner has precisely two ways of obtaining information 
about its own tract: i) drilling a wildcat exploration well that 
produces nonexcludable information, or ii) free-riding off of the 
information provided if the other firm drills a wildcat exploration 
well. 
Such information overlaps are common in oilfield explora-
tion. The problems caused by the resulting externality are well 
~ . . ... ~,. .. - . ,. ' . 
. ·"····--~-.. ..: :..-~.-;; ,··- -: ,..,,,_.; .... ·, ... ,,..._. ... . ·:-~,_._,, 
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recognized. There is no question that the oil industry observes 
and acts upon the information externally. From the nineteenth 
century until today, the "oil scout," whose job is to gain such 
information, has been a recognized job description, although the 
methods employed have changed to some extent. In 1882, the owners 
of a Pennsylvania well nicknamed "646" fenced the drilling site and 
surrounded it with armed guards. Yet, "with oil scouts dangling 
from _every available tree and bush, the flow of news from '646' 
grew every day" (reported in Williamson and Daum [1959], pp. 
390-393). In the 1950s, oil scouts from different companies but 
assigned to the same geographical region would often compare notes. 
The uncooperative would sometimes find themselves the target of 
a "scout check," a weekly meeting in which each oil scout reported 
to the group what he had found out. 7 
It is also clear that the oil industry recognizes the 
potential gains from directly cooperating in the drilling/information 
gathering process. For example, John R. Kennedy [1976] remarks 
that "if we ignore the wildcat-contribution problem we invite 
either bankruptcy or the near termination of exploratory drilling" 
(p. 88). Grayson [1960] has described certain cooperative ins-
titutions, broadly called trading institutions, in which the 
value of the information externalities are specifically con-
sidered by the participants. Four connnonly used institutions are: 
1) the "dry hole contribution" in which one firm agrees to dri.11 
a well, and another agrees to pay the first a prearranged amount 
of money if the well turns out to be a dry hole. 
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2) the "bottom hole contribution" in which a contribution is paid 
regardless of the outcome of the well that X has agreed to 
drill. 
3) the "acreage contribution" which is like 1) or 2), but acreage, 
rather than money, is exchanged. 
4) the "joint venture" in which the firms combine their 
operations over the tracts. 
These categories are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, as 
these and other features can be permuted to fit the nature of the 
deal at hand. 
Clearly, these institutions differ from one another 
in many ways, not the least of which is the manner in which they 
share their risks. For this paper, however, they will be collapsed 
into a general, abstract cooperative institution in which the 
firms agree to behave in a certain prescribed manner, and in which 
there may be an exchange of something of value between them. The 
question to be addressed is whether these cooperative institutions 
completely remedy any potential market failure caused by the 
externality. 
The game form which will be used to model the firms' 
conflict will consist of two players (firms A and B) each with 
two strategies : i) drill an exploration well today (D); or ii) 
hold out until tomorrow (ND). The firms will be assumed to be 
expected profit maximizers. The "payoffs" of the games will be 
discounted expected profits. The normal form representation of 
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the game is depicted in Figure 2. Relationships among the values 
of the entries in the payoff matrix will be set according to 
different axiom sets in order to create different games. 
The payoffs to the firms are discounted expected profits. 
From the very beginning it has been posited that oil exploration 
is a risky undertaking. Implicit, then, in the 2 X 2 normal form 
representation of the games is an expanded game in which "nature" 
is a player via a random variable, 8, which describes the presence 
or absence of oil. In this model, information about 8 comes only 
through drilling into the reservoir. 
To illustrate the role of "nature's" play, consider the 
following example in which there are two states of the world: 8 1 
in which there is oil under both tracts and 82 in which there is 
oil under neither tract. 
Let: V~ be the discounted stream of earnings to firm j of a 
successful well drilled today. 
Vj = the discounted stream of earnings to firm j of a successful 
l 
well drilled tomorrow. 
cj = the cost to firm j to drill a well today. 
0 
cj = the discounted cost to firm j of drilling a well tomorrow. 
1 
qi = prob. of el' (1 - <Pl) = prob. of 82. l 
Then, referring back to Figure 2, the expected payoffs to firm A 








ETI.(i,k) =optimal discounted expected profits of 
J 
firm j when firm A uses strategy i and firm B uses 
strategy k. 
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The structure of ETIA(ND,D) is important. By waiting 
A 
until the other firm has drilled, firm A can avoid the cost c1 
of drilling a structure known to be dry. The same relationship 
holds for firm B if it waits until firm A has drilled. 
Other.more complicated models of uncertainty are possible 
(continuous outcomes, or the'possibility that one well will 
be dry while the other produces). The concept of the cal-
culation of expected profits for each strategy choice remains 
the same. 
Each of the noncooperative games will be considered in 
terms of existing solution concepts from the literature on game 
theory. It is hoped that this will capture the outcomes which 
a player (firm) would reasonably expect to occur if the games are 
noncooperative. This expected noncooperative outcome, a type of 
threat point, will be compared with the possible outcomes when the 
same games are played cooperatively, with side payments. When 
the analogous solution concepts, or "reasonable" outcomes, of the 
cooperative game present the opportunity for both players to have 
strictly higher expected payoffs than at the noncooperative outcome, 
these trading institutions are a rational response to the information 
externality. 
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III. THE NONCOOPERATIVE GAME 
The general model of the preceding section can be transformed 
into specific types of games by choosing specific assumptions about 
the relationships among the payoff entries. In this section, four 
such relationships will be introduced as maintained assumptions. 
These four postulates define the two-period feature of the 
problem and specify the nature of the value of the information. 
With this set of naintained assumptions, five specific two-person 
games are formed by adding more detailed structure on the preferences 
of the players for acting today rather than tomorrow. One of 
these five games is that presented also by Stiglitz [1975]. 
In analyzing these noncooperative games, an attractive 
behavioral assumption is that individuals will not play dominated 
strategies (if such exist). This assumption allows a direct analysis 
of "reasonable" outcomes in two important cases. First, if each 
player has a unique dominant strategy, then this assumption leads 
immediately to the intuitively obvious outcome, the dominant strategy 
equilibrium. Likewise, suppose that all but one of the players 
has a unique dominant strategy. The player without a dominant 
strategy knows, from the above assumptions, the choices of others. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that he will play a best 
response. 
While this behavioral assumption seems intuitive (for 
example, the dominant strategy equilibrium is present in the 
confess/confess outcome in the prisoner's dilemma), it is not, 
by itself, a solution concept. There does exist at least one formally 
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developed solution concept which is motivated in an analogous fashion: 
the "solution in the weak sense" of Luce and Raiffa [1957]. A 
more detailed exposition is presented in Appendix I. For the remainder 
of the body of this paper, however, the important feature of the 
solution in the weak sense is that (by reducing the game through 
eliminating dominated strategies), joint dominant strategy equilibriums 
and dominant strategy/best response equilibriums are solutions. 
Using the solutions in the weak sense (where it exists) 
as the concept of a reasonable outcome of noncooperative play, 
it will be shown that nonoptimal outcomes can occur in three of 
the five possible specific games to be developed. 
Formally, then, the following four assumptions will 
be maintained: 
Al: There are two firms. 
A2: Each firm realizes that if they both hold out (ND) until 
tomorrow, each will have to make a "drill/don't drill" 
decision based solely upon its own actions. 
As will be pointed out in a later section, restricting 
the analysis to two firms, as opposed to N firms, does eliminate 
the possibility of one firm "free-riding" while others sign an 
information sharing agreement. 
A3: If one firm drills today (D), its profits are unaffected 
by whether or not the other firm drills. This assumption 
requires that: 
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EITA(D,D) = EITA(D,ND) for firm A 
Because the analysis here is focused on the exploration 
stage, and in order to isolate the effects of the information 
externality, the potential production externality effects during 
f~eld development are ignored by this assumption. 
A4: Information is socially valuable in that the maximum of joint 
discounted expected profits occurs through sequential drilling 
(either (D,ND) or (ND,D)), and the information is privately 
valuable in that each firm would, if holding out, prefer to 
receive it than not. 
That information is socially valuable can be seen to be a restriction 
on the relationship between revenues and costs in periods 0 
and 1. The assumption requires that the maximum of discounted 
joint expected profits is either 
<P
1 
(~) - C~ + <I>
1 
(V~ - C~) =(A drills first and B observes 8): 
or 
<P 1 (V~) - C~ + <P1 (~ - C~) = (B drills first and A observes 8). 
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Information is privately valuable in that 
With the preceding four maintained assumptions, there 
are five different game types which can be formed by introducing 
specific restrictions on the firms' preferences for drilling today 
versus drilling tomorrow. 
Game 1: HOLDOUT/HOLDOUT 
Consider the following assumptions: 
A5: Given that the other firm holds out, a firm is indifferent 
between drilling today and holding out until tomorrow, i.e. 
A6: Given that the other firm drills, a firm would rather hold 
out and receive the information than drill. 
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The axiom structure [Al, A2, A3, A4, AS, A6] for both 
firms yields the normal form represented in Figure 3. Holding 
out (ND) is a dominant strategy for each firm, so (ND, ND) is a 
dominant strategy equilibrium. (ND, ND) is also the only strong 
Nash equilibrium and the solution in the weak sense. 
A similar result obtains if A5 is replaced by 
A7: Given that the other firm holds out, the firm would rather 
hold out itself, i.e. 
This may occur because the firm's development policy 
would require expensive "holding" of this resource if explored 
today, or because the firm is waiting for valuable information 
from another source. 
In the structure [Al, A2., A3, A4, A6, A7] for each firm, 
(call it game l') (ND,ND) is the dominant strategy equilibrium, 
as well as the only Nash equilibrium and the solution in the 
weak sense. (See Figure 4). This is essentially the game form 
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Suppose the relationship between drilling today and 
drilling tomorrow when the other firm holds out is changed from 
A5 to A8: 
A8: Given that the other firm doesn't drill, the firm prefers 
drilling today to drilling tomorrow i.e. 
That is, absent the possibility of receiving a free good 
(information), the firm prefers to drill today. This could be 
due to costs of waiting such as lease payments, renegotiation 
deadlines, etc. However, when assumption A6 still holds, any 
waiting costs must be small enough so that the firm will still 
prefer to hold out if it knows that it will receive valuable 
information. If this modification holds for only one firm, while 
the other firm is described by AS or A7, rather than A8, the axioms 
[Al, A2, A3, A4, AS or A7, A6] for A, and 
A[l, A2, A3, A4, A6, A8] for B 
result in a normal form game such as in Figure S. 
The choice facing firm B is now seemingly more com-
plicated. If A drills today, B would rather hold out; if A holds 
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is that firm A will never drill today, because A's dominant 
strategy is to hold out. Under the assumption that this is a 
f 1 · f t• ll B . A' d . t t game o comp ete in orma ion, recognizes s ominan s rategy, 
and chooses his best response, D. Therefore, (ND,D) is the solution 
in the weak sense. 
GAME 3: BATTLE OF THE SEXES 
If AB, rather than AS, holds for each firm, the analysis 
becomes substantially more complicated. The general form is 
represented in Figure 6 along with a more illustrative numerical 
example. 
Neither player has a dominant strategy. There are three 
Nash equilibria: (D,ND) and (ND,D) are strong Nash equilibria, 
and there is a weak Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies (in the 
example in Figure 6, the mixed strategy equilibrium is (probability 
of D = 1/2 probability,of ND= 1/2) played by A and B). 
Formally, because the Nash equilibrium pairs are neither 
equivalent nor interchangeable, this game is not solvable by any 
of the standard solution concepts. This is an intuitive result. 
Because the Nash equilibria are not equivalent, simply restricting 
attention to the set of equilibrium points does little to remove 
the element of conflict from the game. Because the equilibria 
are not interchangeable, there is no guarantee that the players 
in the noncooperative setting can reach an equilibrium point ~ven 






D r,s r,t r > w 
A s > z 
ND u,s w,z t > s 




D 1,1 1,2 
A 
ND 2,1 0,0 
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mixed equilibrium strategy. Of course, the disappointing 
truth is that the joint maximin outcome (D, D) is not in equilib-
rium. 
There is one other possible way to describe the outcome 
of this noncooperative game. One can suppose that, given the 
absence of a well defined solution in the standard sense, each 
firm simply attempts to maximize its expected payoff based upon 
some subjective probability distribution over the strategy choices 
by the other firm. We will return to the problems such a situat~on 
can cause in a later section. 
GAMES 4 and 5: 
Finally, there is the possibility that for one firm 
AB holds but not A6. Rather, the value of the drilling information 
to one firm is not enough to persuade it to hold out, even if it 
knows that the other firm intends to drill. This is expressed as A9
8
• 
A9 : EIIA (ND,D) 2_ EIIA (D,D) for firm A, or 
If this is true for only one firm, say firm A, the 
result is as in Figures 7 and 8, represented by the axioms 
For A: [Al, A2, A3, A4, AB, A9] 
For B: [Al, A2, A3, A4, A6, and either AS, or A7 (Game 4) or 
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ND 
1,1.2 
.1, . 5 
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Firm A has a dominant strategy to drill today. Firm 
B, which has either a dominant strategy not to drill (Game 4) 
or a contingent strategy (Game 5) therefore holds out. These 
games are solvable in the weak sense (D,ND). 
Table I summarizes the nature of each of the five 
games according to whether the assumptions imply that the 
firm has a dominant strategy to drill today, a dominant strategy 
to hold out, or a contingent strategy (drill if opponent doesn't 
drill today, hold out if opponent drills today). 
IV. THE NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES AND THE QUESTION OF OPTIMALITY 
In the previous section, it was shown that by altering 
the assumptions over the firm's preferences, five different game 
forms are possible. In only two of these (games 4 and 5) will 
the optimal drilling pattern necessarily be a result of noncoop~ 
erative exploration choices. 
One of the maintained assumptions was that the information 
had "social value" in that the joint maximum of expected profits 
occurs when one of the firms drills today, the other observes the 
information and makes a decision on drilling tomorrow. Clearly, 
then, in games 1 and l', in which a nonsequential drilling 
strategy (ND,ND) is the solution, the noncooperative play does not 
reach an optimum. In game 2, a sequential drilling strategy does 
occur at the solution in the weak sense, but the result may not 
be optimal because the solution may be to drill the wells in the 
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"D" r 
Dominant Game Game Not ·-
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out" may face penalties o~ its lease if exploratory drilling 
does not commence. The payoff matrix might look like Figure 9. 
In this example, the solution is (ND,D). However, the optimal 
staggered drilling order is (D,ND). Only in Games 4 and 5 is the 
solution to noncooperative play optimal. (A proof of this is 
shown in Appendix II). 
Finally, Game 3 has no solution in the weak sense, and 
therefore there is no guarantee the noncooperative would 
necessarily achieve the joint optimum. 
V. THE THEORY AND STRUCTURE OF COOPERATIVE DRILLING GAMES 
Each of the four proposed cooperative arrangements 
may be appropriate under differeht circumstances. If the 
noncooperative result is that both firms hold out, a dry hole 
contribution, bottom hole contribution, or acreage contribution 
could induce one firm to drill. For the other cases, a joint 
venture or a combination of proposals might be suggested. 
Yet the two critical characteristics of any cooperative 
play of the drilling game are that i) the firms are allowed the 
opportunity to connnunicate and coordinate their drilling 
strategy and ii) the firms can make "side payments" that is, 
transfers of case or acreage ownership. 
The total net profit to each firm from a coordinated 
drilling strategy will be the profit from its own property plus 






D 1.4, .9 1.4, 1.2 
A 
ND 1. 6, .9 1.4, .8 
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Thus, there are two important choices to be made in 
the cooperative play of the game: i) the drilling strategies 
to be chosen, and ii) the side payments to be arranged. 
The theory of cooperative game solutions is built upon 
two fundamental concepts: i) the coalition, and ii) the charac-
teristic function. Let I be the set of all players. A coalition 
C is a subset of I which agrees to a joint strategy. The charac-
teristic function of a game, call it V(S), is a set function map-
ping subsets of I (coalitions) into the real numbers. The charac-
teristic function denotes "the joint payoff which the members of 
any given coalition (S c I) would achieve if they did cooperate . -
among themselves but did not cooperate with the remaining players" 
(Harsanyi, 1977, pp. 213). A characteristic function has the 
properties that V(~) = 0 (where~ is the empty set), and 
V(R US) ~ V(R) + V(S) V'R,S c I 
(That is, two groups can always do at least as well by acting 
together as by acting separately.) 
For the two person drilling games in this paper, the 
concern is with V(A), V(B), and V(A + B). V(A) and V(B) are 
the payoffs each firm would get by acting alone. As has been 
shown in the previous section, however, this concept is neither 
simply nor unambiguously defined. Many game theorists have adop-
ted the convention that V(i) is nerson i's m;:nd1Tlin value, . 
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that is, how much the one person coalition of i can guarantee if 
all other players (firms) turn against him. (See, for example, 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern [1953], pp. 538-564.) The question 
that needs to be asked here is how this general adoption of the 
maximin concept squares with some of the "reasonable" outcomes 
presented in the previous section. Unfortunately, all is not well 
as the following lemmata (about two person games) demonstrate: 
Lemma 1: Let a* be a dominant strategy for player j; then, 
a* is also a maximin strategy. 
Proof: If a* is not maximin 3 some strategy pair (a,S) such 
that EIT.(a,S) > EIT.(a*,S) ++- • 
J J 
Lemma 2: Let (a*,S*) be a dominant strategy equilibrium. Then, 
Proof: 
A A 
for each player j,EIT.(a*,S*) > V(j) if V(j) is the 
J -
maximin characteristic function. 
If, say, V(A) > EITA(a*,8*) then 3 a strategy a such 
that EITA(a;S*) > EITA(a,S*) ++-. 
Lemma 3: Let (a*,S*) and V(j) be defined as in Lemma 2. It 











V(A) = V(B) = 4 





Lemma 4: If A has a dominant strategy a*, and 8 is B's "best 
response," 8 need not be B's maximin strategy. 
Proof: Consider 
/\ 
D B ND a* = D, 8 = D, 
D 100, 10 100, 4 but B's maximin 
A strategy is ND. 
ND 4, 0 4, 4 
Lemma 5: If the pair (a' , 8') is the "solution in the weak sense," 
Proof: 
ETI. (a',8') 2:. V(j) Vj where V(j) is the maximin value. 
J 
Suppose V(A) > ETIA(a',8'). Then, 3 a~ ETIA(a',8') < ETIA(a,8'). 
But, then, (a',8') is not an equilibrium in the reduced game++-. 
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Lemma 6: Let a',8', & V(j) be defined in Lemma 5, then it is 
Proof: 
possible that for both players ETI.(a',8') > V(j) 
J 
Consider 
B (D,D) is the solution 
D ND 
in the weak sense. 
D 100, 5 80, 4 
V(A) < ETIA(D,D) 100 = 80 = 
A 
ND 4, 0 4' 4 V(B) = 4 < ETIB(D,D) = 5 
All of the games developed in the previous section, except Game 3, 
have either dominant strategy equilibria or solutions in the weak 
sense (a dominant strategy equilibrium is also a solution in the 
weak sense). The maintained behavioral proposition of this paper 
is that if both players see that the cooperative play makes them 
better off, then the cooperative institutions are a "natural re-
:;ponse." 
However, this leaves a key conjectural ambiguity. How does 
player A believe that player B will respond? In the context simply 
of noncooperative play, the reasoning behind solutions such as the 
solution in the weak sense suggests that if firm A has a dominant 
strategy, firm B recognizes this, and (despite any preplay threats) 
B believes A will ultimately choose to play his own dominant strategy. 
As was previously mentioned, however, when dealing with cooperative 
games, the reasoning typically begins with the concept of the best 
someone can do if everyone else turns against him. 
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As was demonstrated in Lemma 5, the divergence between the 
maximin characteristic function and the weak solution is asymmetric. 
The payoff at the solution in the weak sense is always at least as 
great as the maximin characteristic function. This is intuitive. No 
player will ever consider a "reasonable" outcome one which pays less 
than the same player would guarantee himself regardless of the outcome 
of others. However, as shown in Lemma 6, there is the possibility 
that the outcome at the solution in the weak sense pays each player 
more than the maximin characteristic function value. 
The problem for this analysis is that by underevaluating V(i), 
one runs the risk of overstating the potential for cooperative play. 
Therefore, the following alternate characteristic function, V0 (S), 
for games with a solution in the weak sense, is proposed: 
•V 0 (f)) = 0 
,.... ,.... 
•Vo(j) = ETI.(a,S) where (a,S) is the solution in the weak 
J 
sense of the noncooperative game, (j = A,B). 
•V 0 (A U B) = the maximum of joint profits obtained 
from an efficient drilling schedule. 
(Note that V0 (S) fulfills the conditions that 
V 0 (CJ) = 0 
V0 (R US) 2:_ V0 (R) + v~(S) VS c I). 
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In terms of the drilling games developed in the previous section, 
the potential for cooperative institutions occurs when each firm 
sees itself being better off at the outcome of cooperative play 
then at the "reasonable outcome" of noncooperative play. In the 
setting of cooperative games, the first criterion which will 
be adopted for a "reasonable" outcome is that it is in the "core." 
That is, let X = (ETI!,ETI~) be a vector of final net expected 




ETI* + ETI* = V(A U B) 
A B 
ETI* > V0 (A) A-
E~ ~ V 0 (B) 
The previously developed restriction on the definition 
of the bargaining mechanism can be formally stated as a second 
criterion on a proposed outcome X. 
If 
TI*+ TI*> V0 (A) + V0 (B) 
A B 
then TI! > V0(A); TI~ > V0 (B) 
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That is, both firms will be made strictly better off when cooperative 
play produces· greater joint expected profits than noncooperative 
play. Other "fair" properties of bargaining mechanisms are dis-
cussed in Harsanyi and Luce and Raiffa. A specific example of a 
bargaining scheme is given by Kennedy. 
Because of the implicit bargaining procedure, the 
possibility of an extended bargaining game (see Luce and Raiffa 
pp. 140-143) must be addressed. In an extended bargaining game, 
the firms would list moves in the noncooperative game as binding 
threats, say dA and dB. Then the outcome (dA'~) would become the 
threat point for the bargaining mechanism. In Harsanyi's terms, 
the noncooperative threat game becomes "dependent" on the bar-
gaining game. However, it will be assumed here that firms cannot 
make binding threats. In Harsanyi's terms, the noncooperative 
conflict game is "independent" of the bargaining game. The 
"threat point" or expected outcome will be determined strictly 
by the noncooperative play as outlined in the previous section, 
9 
and not by any preplay nonbinding threats made by the firms. 
So, for games 1, l', 2, and 4 the "solution in the weak sense" will 
still be considered the expected noncooperative outcome. 
VI. A SUMMARY OF INCENTIVES FOR COOPERATIVE DRILLING 
In the four games with a weak solution in noncooperative 
play, the important policy conclusion is that the incentives for 
cooperative information sharing (V 0 (A U B) > V0 (A) + V0 (B)) 
occur precisely when the expected result of noncooperative play 
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is inefficient. Furthermore, when this occurs there is some 
outcome in the core (chosen by a bargaining mechanism) that makes 
both firms strictly better off than noncooperative play. If 
activating these institutions is costless, then the existence of 
the information externality is not per se an argument for an 
exploration subsidy in these cases. 
When the maximin characteristic function, call it V(S), 
is used in lieu of the characteristic function based on the solution 
in the weak sense, V0 (S), this implication runs only in one direction: 
when the solution is nonoptimal, firms recognize the gains from 
joint action. However, in Game 4, Figure 7, (D,ND), is the solution 
in the weak sense but V(A U B) >~(A)+ V(B). That is, cooperative 
behavior is indicated where none is needed. 
However, there is still the case of Game 3 which has no 
solution. It is quite possible that no reasonable characteristic 
function exists for this game. In the example in Figure 6, if the maximin 
value is the "threat point" payoff, V(j), then each firm will recognize 
the potential gainB from cooperative play, as V(A U B) > V(A) + V(B). 
But (D,D) is not an equilibrium, and it is not unreasonable to suspect 
that there are conditions in which one expects a greater payoff. 
However, suppose we create a function V'(j) which is the amount j 
"expects" to receive from noncooperative play (with j's expectation 
based upon his own subjective evaluation of his opponents strategy). 
There is always the possibility that each firm .is (incorrectly) con-
vinced that it can bluff out the other; each plays the strategy ND, and 
V'(A) + V'(B) = (2) + (2) > V(A U B) (the efficient outcome). 
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Neither firm would initiate cooperative play, and a promoter 
attempting to put together a deal would be frustrated by the 
firms' attitudes. In such a situation, noncooperative play leads 
to a suboptimal result, but private cooperative action would fail. 
VII. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTITUTION 
The date on which two oilmen first exchanged information 
for something else of value will probably continue to be lost in 
history. However, the evidence indicates that such contracts have 
been common for at least sixty years, and perhaps much longer. 
Contractual resource exchange has been part of the oil industry 
from the very beginning, all the way back to Col. Drake's well in 
Titusville, Pennsylvania, in 1859, although the contracts on that 
well do not appear to be connected to an information externality. 
Oilmen began to pay more attention to the information 
externality as they developed more sophisticated theories'of 
oil location. After the birth of the oil industry in 1859, persons 
looking for oil soon realized that there were ways of spotting new 
wells other than by drilling on known oil seeps or as close as 
possible to an existing well. For example, Williamson and Daum 
[1959], in describing the oil location theories of a Mr. Angell, 
show how acting upon his theory (essentially that oil is located 
in veins, like coal) required that Mr. Angell gain information 
from other leaseholders: 
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Starting with information from his own 
three producing wells at Belle Island, in 1867, 
some eighteen miles below Franklin on the Allegheny 
River, Angell began a tedious process of collecting 
fragmented information about other wells at 
different locations: depths, differences between 
upper surfaces of the different sand rocks, their 
thickness, quantity, and quality of oil showings 
in the second sand, and texture of third sand 
rocks. At Foster Station, about nine miles 
north of Belle Island by river, he found 
striking similarities with his own wells. In 
1868 and 1869 he hired a professional surveyor 
to aid him, and in the following year, in part-
nership with Frederick Prentice, he leased or 
purchased all land on the line he formulated 
between Belle Island and Foster Station. 
One historian of early day oil exploration places the 
development of the formal information trading institution as it is 
known today at about the turn of the century in what were then 
the newer oil areas of the Southwest. The following quote is 
from this informal history by Tait [1946] (pp. 133-134): 
To make the great number of discoveries from 
1905 to 1929 required not only ingenu~ty and 
daring, which the wildcatter had always possessed, 
but something more; namely, a new mode of financing 
wildcat wells. Most of the pioneering from the 
Kansas River to the Rio Grande was done by men 
operating on a well worn shoestring •••• This new 
method of financing was called checkerboarding, 
and the man who devised it in its embryonic form 
was James E. O'Neil •.•. As soon as he appreciated 
the vastness of the Southwest, Jim O'Neil con-
cluded that when the oil game crossed the river, 
as men used to express the migration from 
southeastern Illinois to Kansas, Oklahoma and 
Texas, it entered an empire where new methods 
of leasing and development were essential. Whole 
counties out here had never had a well,a nd there 
was nothing tn indicate whether there was oil. 
To lease and pay rental on all of them would 
obviously have bankrupted even the Standard 
[for whom O'Neil worked]. O'Neil devised the 
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custom of leasing scattered farms and ranches, 
say six sections in all out of the thirty six in a 
township, and so distributed that the company 
was likely to be in on any drilling play that 
was started thereabouts. The map of such a 
township, once O'Neil's land and lease men 
had finished their work there, looked like 
a checkerboard. Next step was for the company 
to offer to put up money.to help anyone who 
wished to drill in the neighborhood, sometimes 
putting it up as a payment without condition, 
sometimes· as dry hole money to be paid by the 
company only if the well were unproductive. 
Tait indicates that these institutions were developed 
between 1905 and 1929. In fact, two important court cases from 
1929 serve to document that such contracts were considered to be 
common by the early 1920s. The exposition of facts in Atlantic 
0 · 1 P d . C M ll d . . d . 1 ro uc1ng o. v. asterson 1scusses a contract s1gne in 
Februrary, 1923, and notes.(at p. 481) that: 
the contract sued on what is called a 'dry hole' 
or information contract. It is a type of 
contract, quite common in the business of oil 
production, under which one who drills a test 
well on a lease in which he is interested receives 
contributions either in money or acreage from 
owners of adjoining lands or leases, the object 
of the contribution being to secure the benefit 
of information to be derived from the drilling 
of a test well near their own holdings. 
12 Similarly, the court in Hoffer Oil Corporation v. Carpenter, 
a breach of contract suit inv0ving a 1925 information sharing 
agreement, called such an exchange "an everyday transaction." 
These two cases are more than convenient evidence of 
the existence of a particular type of contract. The opinions of 
the courts deal with important legal questions about the standing 
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of contracts covering trades of information; had the decisions 
been different, information trading contracts would have almost 
certainly become much less common. 
In the Atlantic case, the defendant, Masterson, failed 
to undertake all the drilling that was specified in the contract, 
thus denying Atlantic the information that the contract promised. 
Atlantic sued for damages to cover the costs it bad incurred by 
obtaining the desired information by drilling a well on its own 
property. While the lower courts agreed that the defendant bad 
breached the contract, they rejected the contention of Atlantic 
that it was entitled to recover the cost of drilling a well on its 
own property. Instead, the lower courts awarded Atlantic only 
"nominal damages." (The term "nominal damages" refers to token 
amounts of money awarded to a plaintiff when the court agrees that 
the defendant has breached, but rejects the plaintiff's claim for 
damages. The significance of nominal damages is primarily symbolic.) 
Atlantic appealed the award of only nominal damages to the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. The circuit court ruled against 
Atlantic, saying (at p. 482): 
It cannot reasonably be supposed that 
the parties contemplated the drilling of a well 
on appellant's 20 acres at the expense of the 
appellees, for in that event appellant would 
have been the sole owner of the well as well 
as of any oil that might have been produced 
therefrom .••• Appellant failed to get the 
information it contracted for, and it would 
seem to follow that the damage it sustained 
was the value of that information. If under 
an information contract, such as this is, 
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one contributing owner could recover the cost 
of drilling the test well, every other such 
contributing owner could do the same. The 
rather startling result would be that the 
driller of the test well would be liable 
to each contributor for the full cost of 
drilling. 
The opinion in the Atlantic case correctly recognized 
that the test well produced joint products: one, the oil to 
be produced, was essentially a private good; the second, the 
information from the well, was a good which benefited both 
concerns. The judges also correctly distinguished between the 
value of information to a particular individual and the cost of 
providing that information for both. 
An even more important case is Hoffer, for in a set 
of circumstances similar to that in the Atlantic case, a company 
breaching an information sharing contract, Hoffer, argued that 
no damages at all could be awarded, based on the following two 
assertions (at pp. 590-591): 
First, that no benefit would have 
accrued to Carpenter as a direct, natural, 
and proximate consequence of the drilling 
of such test well, and that, therefore, no 
general damages can be recovered .... 
Second, that the completion of such test 
well might have disclosed oil and gas in paying 
quantities or might have resulted in a dry 
hole, and therefore the benefits to be derived 
from the completion of such well were too 
uncertain and speculative to afford any basis 
for the recovery of damages. 
The first of Hoffer's arguments denies the value of the 
information externality. The second disputes the economic argument 
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that information, although purchased to ameliorate uncertainty, 
does have a well defined ex ante valuation. Had the court accepted 
Hoffer's claims, the effect would have been to develop a legal view 
of information that denied its economic significance. However, 
Hoffer lost in the lower courts and, after an appeal, the Tenth 
Circuit Court also ruled against Hoffer. First, the court dispatched 
the claims that the information had no value, and that it was 
"speculative" (at pp. 591-592): 
Such information was of substantial value 
to Carpenter, who owned leases on land adjacent 
to the leases upon which the well was contracted 
to be drilled. That the drilling of the we~l might 
have produced a dry hole and afforded unfavorable 
geological information does not, as contended by 
co~.~nsel for the Oil Corporation (Hof fer), render 
the damages resulting from the failure to furnish 
such information so speculative as to prevent 
recovery. Contracts for such information are always 
made prospectively. Persons situated as was 
Carnenter in the present case realize that such 
information may indicate their land will produce 
oil an<l gas in paying quantities, or it may indi-
cate otherwise. Nevertheless, they are willing to 
pay a substantial consideration therefor, because 
it is of benefit to such persons to make reasonably 
certain that which is uncertain, in order that 
they may act prudently in future expenditures 
in development of their land for oil and gas .••. 
In the development of unproven oil land, well 
managed oil companies employ high salaried 
and competent geologists to make investigations 
and give their reports and opinions based thereon. 
Likewise, oil operators constantly make contracts 
such as the contract in the instant case, by which 
they contribute, in cash or in valuable leases, 
a portion of the cost of a test well in return 
for a log of such well and the information 
which such test discloses. These facts compel the 
conclusions that such information has a substa~tial 
value. 
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Having disposed of the argument that no damages could 
be awarded because the information was valueless, the court then 
proceeded to refute the contention that damages were too "uncertain" 
to be awarded (thus confirming that the information had a well-
defined ex ante valuation) (at p. 593): 
It is, of course, impossible to determine 
what facts and geological information the 
drilling of the oil well would have disclosed, 
and whether the information would have indicated 
that the land on which Carpenter's leases were 
located would produce oil in paying quantities. 
We have demonstrated, we believe, that such infor-
mation, in any event, would have been valuable to 
Carpenter. Furthermore, as stated above, contracts 
for such information are always made prospectively. 
The information can be obtained only py 
drilling, and such drilling costs substantially 
the same amount, whether the result is production 
of oil and gas in paying quantities or a 'dry hole.' 
Therefore, the damages must be based upon the value 
of the services rendered in obtaining the information, 
and not upon the value of the information after 
it is obtained •••• 
Although the court disagreed with each of Hoffer Oil 
Company's points, Carpenter did not win a complete victory. Like 
the Atlantic Oil Company, Carpenter had requested damages based upon 
the cost of drilling a test well on his own property. The court 
relying upon the decision of the Atlantic case, ruled against 
Carpenter on this point saying (at p. 591) : 
The cost of drilling the well is not, in 
our opinion, the true 1!1easure of damages. 
Carpenter had no interest in the land upon 
which the oil well was to be drilled. The well, 
when completed, and the oil, if any, belonged 
wholly to the Oil Corporation. Because of 
these facts, Carpenter would have received no 
direct benefit from the well itself, as 
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distinguished from the information which the 
drilling of the well would have disclosed .... 
If he were compensated damages to the extent of 
the full cost of the well, it would give him the 
equivalent of an oil well on his own land, from 
which he would receive the benefit of the 
service for which he had contracted, and in 
addition, the oil well itself and any oil and 
gas that might be produced. 
The court awarded Carpenter, as noted above, the value 
of the service in obtaining the contracted-for information. The 
court decided that such value should be based upon 
what a reasonable person owning land adjacent 
to the lands on which another proposes to drill 
such a test well similarly situated and of 
similar oil bearing potentialities as the land 
of the parties in the instant case would 
ordinarily pay.by way of contribution to the 
cost of such a test well and the geological 
information which the drilling thereof would 
disclose (p. 593). 
The recommended method of calculating the damages follows 
from the fact that, unlike those cases in which the breach of 
contract involves a good which can be valued in markets other 
than the contract at issue, this case involved a strictly bilateral 
market with the specific good being unique to the particular 
situation. This made the correct amount of damages difficult to 
ascertain. However, having established liability and rejected the 
argument that the damages were too speculative to be recovered, 
the court was following established precedent in ruling that 
recovery of damages is not voided merely because they are difficult 
to calculate. In endorsing the use of testimony by experts 
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(apparently the procedure that had been followed in the lower 
courts) the court was approving an attempt to estimate the value 
of the damages by consulting those who were themselves familiar 
with such bilateral markets and the goods (information) exchanged 
there. 
Thus, the information sharing contracts which are the 
topic of this paper not only have been around a long time, they 
have been recognized by the courts and the oil industry to have 
been commonplace for at least fifty to sixty years. The narrative 
by Tait gives at least a plausible explanation as to why one 
individual (in this case, O'Neil) would incur the costs of 
institutional innovation. The fact that the Southwest did indeed 
contain large reserves of oil and gas undoubtedly helped to 
popularize the institutions. The court cases of the 192-0s helped 
overcome the post agreement coordination of problems that apparently 
were giving rise to breach of contracts for sharing information 
costs. Therefore, in analyzing the present use of this institution, 
the historical record permits the maintained assumptions that 
pre-play start up problems and post-play enforceability questions 
can be ignored. 
115 
VIII. EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE USE OF INFORMATION SHARING CONTRACTS 
In the historical survey of section VII, the basic 
structure of the theoretical model is confirmed: i) there exists 
an information externality in petroleum exploration; ii) cooperative 
institutions for overcoming the suboptimality of noncooperation have 
developed in instances corresponding closely in structure and rationale 
to those cases in which the theory predicts that cooperation would 
be viewed as beneficial to all potential participants. Mr. James 
E. O'Neil, for example, apparently believed that absent his offer 
for dry hole money, no other parties would drill on the neighboring 
parcels, and he was himself under no constraints to drill immediately. 
Such a situation is described by Game 1 or Game 1 1 • It was shown 
that, certainly by the early 1920s, information sharing contracts 
were a common device in planning petroleum exploration. 
The more important policy questions, however, exist not 
in showing that a lot of people did use these contracts, but rather 
in identifying and addressing any instances in which the private 
information sharing arrangements might not have worked very well. 
The theoretical basis for failure has been presented earlier in this 
chapter, in the exposition of the ''battle of the sexes" type drilling 
game; yet the possibility of failure was conjectural, for it depended 
upon the decision strategy of persons involved in such a situation. 
Unfortunately, the data to best test the conjecture is, understandably, 
nonexistent. If certain tracts should be explored via the information 
sharing institutions but are not, then no records of this failure 
will likely exist. That is, the existing data base on the trading 
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institutions (as meager · as it is) still represents evidence from 
the successful application of the contracts. To obtain exact "success 
ratios" would require a denominator representing the total of all 
sites on which exploratory wells should have been drilled with 
cooperative information sharing. A direct measure of this would 
entail evaluation of all unexplored properties in the geographic 
area under consideration (probably the entire United States), a 
formidable task. 
Therefore, the approach adopted here is to seek to find 
indirect tests of the operation .of information sharing. Yet, even 
when data do exist, they have other limitations. For example, there 
are many different types of trading institutions, and most data 
sources typically cover only some of them. Furthermore, even though 
these sharing arrangements are and have been common, they need not 
be transacted on a formal or standardized basis. While the American 
Association of Petroleum Landmen does endorse certain standard forms, 
informal bargaining can and does occur. The participants may trade 
cash, acreage, royalties, motorcycles, oilfield pumps anything 
forming a basis of value in exchange. These trades may be recorded 
on the standard AAPL forms, on a letterhead, or perhaps even more 
informally. 
13 
Despite thes.e major shortcomings in the data base, it is 
possible to turn to the "real world" oil industry and find out more 
about how information trading arrangements do and don't work. 
The most readily available source of information is talking 
to the persons who work with exploration on a day-to-day basis, or 
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going to the journals where they talk to each other. For example, 
one will find that the late 1950s and early 1960s are described by 
oilmen as a period of relatively successful use of the information 
sharing institutions. In 1961, petroleum landman John H. Folks 
told the American Association of Petroleum Geologists: 
There are certain features concerning dry 
hole contributions under serious consideration 
today which should result in uniform thinking .••. 
This (effort) is being made in the belief that 
the 'sharp trading' days are rapidly vanishing. 
There appears everywhere a clearly defined trend 
that the vast majority of management wants to 
bear the true burden in acreage evaluation. 
(Folks, 1957) 
During the same time period (late 1950s and early 1960s) 
many in the oil industry apparently felt that there was an "unwritten 
law" that if a company had acreage near a wildcat, the company would 
14 contribute dry hole money. 
The basis for firm behavior articulated as a series of 
norms about "unwritten laws" or "true burdens" can be explained quite 
easily by the theoretical model of this chapter: what is being 
observed is precisely the case that all parties recognize and act to 
obtain the benefits of cooperative play of the game. The comments 
of Mr. Warren Taylor [1962] that firms during the period were more 
willing to shelve exploration plans suggests that the "waiting costs" 
described in section III were low, and that drilling games of types 
1, l', and 2 were common. Not surprisingly, these are the games in 
which the theory suggests that the benefits from cooperation exist 
and are most easily recognized. 
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More recently, the U.S. Bureau of the Census has collected 
data since 1973 on "test hole expenditures" (see Table II). These 
numbers show a drop of 46% in the real level of onshore test hole 
contributions from 1973 to 1974, coincident with the large OPEC 
crude oil price increases. This raises an. interesting question: 
since one should expect more exploration with higher crude oil 
prices, does this drop in test hole expenditures say anything about 
the functioning of information sharing institutions? 
There are several hypotheses to be considered. On 
the one hand, as was noted above, this data series may not be a good 
indicator for all information sharing, since it covers just dry 
hole contributions and bottom hole contributions, and specifically 
excludes any form of acreage contribution. Some oilmen say that in 
the 1970s the proportional use of agreements other than dry and 
b h 1 h . d 16 ottom o e money as increase . On the other hand, a Large, 
unexpected increase in crude oil prices could change the type of 
drilling game facing the participants, and the theoretical model 
of this paper suggests that this could alter the use of the 
information sharing agreements. This change would occur for the 
following reasons. The drilling games in section IV differ from one 
another primarily in the preference of the firms for drilling 
today or tomorrow; that is, whether they have a dominant strategy 
to wait, a contingent choice, or a dominant strategy to drill today. 
When there are few or no waiting costs (as it was argued was the 
case in the 1950s and 1960s) many firms have a dominant strategy to 
"hold out" and games of types 1, l', and 2 are common. If waiting 
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TABLE II 
TEST HOLE EXPENDITURES 
Million $ (Real 1967 $) 
Year Onshore Total 
1973 9.92 10. 37 
1974 5.35 6 .03 
1975 7.88 10 .48 
1976 9.27 12.73 
1977 10 .97 18.02 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 
"Annual Survey of Oil and Gas", 1973-1977. 
Figures deflated by the Consumer Price Index. 
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costs increase, more firms find that their drill/don't drill choice 
becomes contingent. As waiting costs further increase, more firms 
find that drilling today becomes a dominant strategy. 
One of the most common examples of a waiting cost actually 
takes the form of a penalty for not drilling today; this occurs 
because firms typically must drill before a certain date, or face 
renegotiation of the lease. When oil prices have taken a large and 
unexpected jump, leaseowners who leased before the unexpected 
increase would presumably demand much more favorable terms from the 
leaseholding firms at renegotiation. Therefore, the OPEC price 
increases can be viewed as potentially increasing the proportion of 
games of types 3, 4, and 5 in the set of potential sites for 
exploration. 
An increase in the proportion of either of these types of 
games could lead to fewer information contracts, although for different 
reasons. In sections V and VI it was shown that cooperative institutions 
may fail .in the "battle of the sexes" game (Game 3). If these 
become more common, the failure rate of the institution might also 
increase. If there are more of Game 4. or Game 5, the contracts 
are not needed to achieve a pareto optimum. (In fact, it is possible 
that waiting costs increase to the point that a drill/drill dominant 
strategy, not allowed in the theoretical model of this paper, 
results.) 
There are, then, at least three possible explanations (not 
mutually exclusive) to explain the observed decrease in the amount 
of test hole expenditures from 1973 to 1974; i) increased waiting 
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costs created more "battle of the sexes" games, leading to increasing 
failure of cooperative information sharing to achieve optimal 
drilling; ii) increased waiting costs created more drilling games 
in which the information contracts were not needed; iii) the data 
series itself does not represent all information sharing, as contracts 
other than dry hole or bottom hole money took up the slack. 
Evidence supporting possibility (iii) has already been 
mentioned. And, (i) and (ii) cannot be directly tested because of 
the unobservability of the key parameters. However, there are some 
indirect tests to show more about what was going'on in 1974. First, 
consider the following identity: 
(1) 
where WC = 
t 
exploratory wells drilled using information sharing 
contracts in time t 
WNC = exploratory wells drilled in time t in which information 
t 
sharing contracts were not needed 
w = 
t 
total exploratory wells drilled in time t. 
Since, as can be seen from Table III, Wt increased from 
1973 to 1974, the following observation obtains: 
Observation: If the decline in test hole expenditures from 
1973 to 1974 does, in fact, represent a decline in WC , then WNC 
t t 
must have increased; that is, the number of wells drilled without 
the necessity of information sharing went up. 
This observation suggests that at least some of the 
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TABLE III 





















(For s.ource and explanation of data, see Footnote 16.) 
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increase in waiting costs translated into more drilling situations 
in which contracts were not needed to promote drilling today. 
Although the above observation supports possibility (ii), 
it does not rule out possibility (i), that there was an increase in 
failures of the institution during the period. A more difficult 
indirect test is needed for possibility (i). Consider another 
identity: 
(2) 
where Ft = the number of "failures," i.e., potential wells which 
should have been drilled, but were not, because of a 
failure to· get the firms to cooperate in information 
sharing. 17 
st = sites, or the total number of exploratory oil wells 
which should have been drilled in time t. 
The unobservability of the sites data is the primary problem 
encountered in an empirical test of possibility (i). However, there 
exists another, observable data series which can serve as a proxy for 
St. This observable, obtainable data series is the amount of leased 
but unexplored acreage in period t, denoted here as At (see Table 
IV) .
18 
At is, in some sense, a measure of the exploratory margin 





ESTIMATED LEASED BUT UNPRODUCTIVE ACREAGE 
Year 
Amount 
6 (in acres)x 10 




1964 338. 372611 
1965 326. 987969 
1966 306 .498942 
1967 299 .967832 
1968 298. 399764 
1969 306 .903800 
1970 306 .202192 
1971 309 .113722 
1972 325 .185371 
1973 339. 219754 




1978 373. 598201 
(For source and explanation of data, see Footnote 17.) 
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The parameter S is indexed by t because the relationship between 
At and St need not be constant over time. Expression (2) can be 
combined with (3) to obtain (4), below: 
(4) 
It will now be established that there are certain conditions 
under which At can be a useful substitute for St. Consider a time 
period in which, because there are no radical changes in the underlying 
economic parameters, the nature of the exploratory margin sites St 
with respect to the drilling games presented here is stable, so that 
the number of wells which should have an information sharing contract 
is proportional to St' or 
+ F ) 
t 
(5) 
Notice that this stable relationship rules out the type of change 
which is explicit in explana·tion (ii) above. Then posit that 
WC = y(aSt) = ~st 
t 
(6) 
that is, the success rate of the information is a constant, y. Then 
again combining expressions yields 
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and then 
That is, the number of wells actually drilled, Wt' can be stated 
as a proportion of unexplored acreage, At. If the parameter Bt' 
relating sites to acreage is constant, then empirically it should 
be observed that 
W = bA 
t t 
or, wells drilled are proportional to acreage. The anecdotal comments 
of the oil industry about the late 1950s and early 1960s (mentioned 
earlier in this section) suggest that the period was one in which 
the underlying game structure was static. This conjecture is also 
supported by the slow, steady decline of crude oil prices. Thus, 
the period of the late 1950s and early 1960s would appear to be a 
prime target to observe a stable, constant relationship between 
exploratory wells and unexplored leaseholdings. If such a relation-
ship is observed, the conjecture of a stable wells/acreage relationship 
will be adopted as a working hypothesis for a test in more recent 
periods. 
Data on Wt and At are available for 1960 to 1969 (Tables 
III and IV). The year 1969 was chosen as the cutoff date because, 
from a reading of the oil industry literature and an initial examination 
of the data, tax and regulatory changes in 1970 appear to have 
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dramatically affected the drilling calculus. Therefore, the 
following linear regression model was estimated: 
A small intercept a and a good regression fit would suggest a confir-
mation of the hypothesis of a stable well/acreage relationship. In 
fact the estimated parameters are: 
a 490.s1 <t = .s27} 
b = 17.32 (t = 6.3) 
2 -2 
R = .8325, R = .8116. 
The actual and predicted values for Wt are listed in Table V. 
The estimated intercept is relatively small in magnitude 
(about 8% of the mean Wt) and statistically insignificant. This 
-2 
and the respectable R and predicted values for Wt lead to the 
acceptance of the following working hypothesis: 
In a period of relatively stable crude oil prices 
(and other economic variables such as taxes, 
regulations, etc.), the proportionality factor 
between St and At is relatively constant. 
The above working hypothesis allows a quite limited and 
tentative test of the performance of the voluntary information sharing 
arrangements in the period around 1974. Even though test hole 
expenditures declined from 1973 to 1974, the number of new field 




Year wt w t actual 
1960 7381.68 7320 
1961 7199. 53 6909 
1962 6831. 35 6794 
1963 6423.45 6570 
1964 6351.48 6632 
1965 6154.29 6182 
1966 5799.43 6158 
1967 5686.31 5271 
1968 5659.15 5205 
1969 5806.44 5956 
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wells increased "enough.'.' If the answer is yes, possibility ( i), 
that the failure rate increased, is refuted. If the answer is no, 
possibility (i) is supported. Unfortunately, attempting to match 
1974 drilling activity to the data from 1970 to 1978 is not valid 
because crude oil prices were most assuredly not stable in the 
period. It is, in fact, the large and unexpected jump in those prices 
which motivates this examination. 
However, the institution of U.S. price controls on domes-
tically produced "new oil" (a category which includes oil from new 
field wildcats) did keep crude oil prices in that category relatively 
stable from 1974 to 1978. This is useful, because the data in Table 
II show that test hole contributions began to increase after 1974, 
reaching pre-embargo levels. Therefore, if the period 1975 to 1978 
can be marked as one of returning to normal, the drilling of new 
field wildcats in 1974 can be compared to that which would be "expected" 
by observing the data from 1975 to 1978. 18 This can be done as 
follows: the "working hypothesis" stated above is employed, and a 
wells/acreage regression is estimated for the years 1975 to 1978. 
The results from the regression are used to "post forecast" an 
expected number of new field wildcats for 1974, and the predicted 
level wl974' is tested statistically against the actual value. When 




wl974(actual) = 5652 
Error 26 7. 32 
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t-statistic on error 3.68 
A one tailed t test shows the error to be significant at a= .05. 
The importance of restricting this kind of estimation to 
~ period in which the assumption on the stability of b can 
t 
reasonably be thought to hold can be seen by running precisely the 
same test using all the years from 1960 to 1978 (excluding 197'.4). 
While, as in the· more limited test of 1975-1978, actual drilling 
for 1974 is lower than predicted (the point estimate of the error 
is actually larger than the first test), the t-statistic on the 
error is insignificant: 
wt 1974 actual 5652 
A 
wt 1974 6177.29 
error 625.29 
t on error: 1.10 
The details of the two regressions are reported in Table VI. 
The paradox of this simple test, then, is that it requires 
a stable environment, yet such periods of stability over the period 
of interest are short (only four years in the one case). To 
approach the problem with the availability of a more robust data 
series, b can be assumed to vary systematically as a function of 
the structure of the economic environment. The argument presented 
here has been that oil and gas prices are an important determinant 
of the structure, affecting both st in expression (3) and a (the 
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TABLE VI 
REGRESSIONS RELATING WELLS DRILLED TO ACREAGE 
Years: 1975-1978 1960-1978 (ex. 1974) 
Intercept: -6289.4215 -355.1425 
(4.00) (. 244) 
Slope: 34 .26 18.612 
(7. 90) (4. 36) 
-2 R: .9533 .51 
N: 4 18 
1974 prediction 
error: 267 625.29 
t on error: 3.68 1.10 
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relationship of the exploratory margin to the drilling games) in 
expression (5). Therefore, the following relationship was estimated 
for 1962 to 1978 (excluding 1974) using ordinary least squares: 
where Pt is a real after-corporate-tax price index for oil and gas, 
(see Table VII) and DUMt is a dummy for the years after 1969 (when 
changes in personal income tax laws and the oil import tariff program 
went into effect). The results of the regression are presented in 
Table VIII. 
The regression estimates were used to compute a prediction 
for Wt/At for 1974, which can be compared with the actual 1974 figure: 
1974 predicted 16 .679213 
1974 actual 15. 86 
error .819213 
t on error .8131 
Using the actual acreage level for 1974, the 1974 error 
translates to approximately 292 wells, which is similar in magnitude 
to the 261-well shortfall predicted by the 1975-1978 test. However, 
the t-test on the error from the more inclusive regression is highly 
insignificant. 
Thus, while the qualitative results of these tests support 
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TABLE VII 




1964 . 399 




















R2 = • 72282 
D.W. = 2 .0469 
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TABLE VIII 
Value t statistic 
21.01881 
-8 .605432 - .55232 
7.665373 .705247 
-3.399538 .,..5. 566899 
N = 16 
F = 14.03886 
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the hypothesis that too few wells were drilled in 1974, there is not 
sufficient evidence to conclude that the error is significantly 
different from zero. Consequently, while there is support for 
explanation (i) from the direction of the error, the alternative 
hypothesis that the cooperative institutions worked as well in 1974 
as in other years cannot be rejected. 
In summary, the empirical evidence for the successful 
application of the cooperative institutions is abundant. The motiva-
tions for cooperative behavior developed in the theoretical section of 
this paper are reflected by the real world development and operation 
of the institutions. 
The theory developed here was also shown to be meaningful 
in that it generates testable hypotheses about real world behavior. 
Specifically, there is the possibility that the cooperative contracts 
will fail under certain circumstances. While the data needed to 
directly test the failure rate are almost nonexistent, a sharp drop 
in reported dry hole and bottom hole contributions in 1974 is suspect. 
There is some support for each of three possible explanations for this 
drop: i) failure of the cooperative arrangements, ii) decreased 
necessity for the agreements, and iii) changes away from dry hole and 
bottom hole contributions to other forms of agreements. The third 
possibility is supported anecdotally by conversations with persons in 
the oil industry; the second is necessarily true if the number of 
agreements did decline, because exploratory drilling increased in 1974. 
The first possibility was tested indirectly, and while it was supported 
by the direction of the predictions, the alternative hypothesis that 
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(i) was not a factor could not be rejected. 
IX. AN EVALUATION OF DIFFERENT POLICIES FOR DEALING WITH THE 
INFORMATION EXTERNALITY 
It is clear that, absent any cooperative or collective 
action, suboptimal exploration patterns may occur. The existing 
cooperative information sharing contracts, discussed at length in this 
chapter, as well as other proposals, such as drilling subsidies> 
address this problem. These programs can be evaluated in light of the 
theory and empirical evidence reported in this chapter. The evaluation 
presented in this section will cover four points: i) whether or not 
the policy is better than doing nothing at all; ii) whether or not 
the policy is optimal; iii) how one policy compares with or relates 
to another; and iv) problems of implementation. 
First, consider the cooperative information sharing 
arrangements which are extant in the oil industry. Within the 
structure of the model as presented in this paper, the information 
sharing contracts are better than no action at all. Using the theory 
of cooperative games and the characteristic function based upon the 
solution in the weak sense (section VI), it is evident that 
cooperative institutions never induce firms to take action which is 
pareto dominated by noncooperative play. On the other hand, the 
theory predicts that there will be situations of successful cooperation 
to improve outcomes from the noncooperative solution. That this does, 
in fact, occur is confirmed overwhelmingly by the empirical evidence from 
the oil iri.austry. The use of these agreements is robust and widespread. 
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The cooperative institutions, however, may not be ideal. 
Theoretically, the potential failure of the cooperative arrangements 
in a battle-of-the-sexes game was noted, and some evidence to support 
this possibility was presented in section VIII. Furthermore, there 
is evidence that, as the number of firms goes from two to greater than 
two, the problems of coordinating and negotiating larger group public 
goods decisions become more acute (Kennedy, [1976]). rhe 1D0dern 
institutions involved with cooperative agreements also demonstrate 
a strong tendency to adapt in order to capture more gains from coopera-
tion. This can be seen in the evolution of the tradition that 
"cooperators" receive better information (electric logs, core samples, 
etc.) than those "hanging from every tree." The adaptation is 
also evident in the ''scout check" meetings of the 1950s, and in the 
switch from money towards acreage and even more elaborate trading 
agreements in the 1970s. 
Finally, the fact that so many institutional details and 
hardwanl! have been put in place makes these trading institutions very 
accessible to potential participants. 
Among the other solutions suggested for dealing with the 
problem of information externalities is a program of government drilling 
subsidies. 
For each of the games in which suboptimal noncooperative 
play could result, there would exist a particular Coase-type 
subsidy for achieving optimality. For example, consider a version of 
Game 3 as depicted in Figure 6. Optimality can be achieved by 
paying either firm A or B a $(1 + £) subsidy, while paying the other 
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firm nothing. The subsidized firm would drill, the other firm would 
hold out. An optimal subsidy scheme must be selective both 
with regards to the firm and as to the drilling situation at hand. 
Different firms in different locations would have to be paid different 
amounts. The information requirements of such a program would be 
immense, if not impossible. 
Another possible type of subsidy would be a simple, blanket 
national subsidy for exploratory drilling. As can be seen from the 
discussion above, a uniform subsidy could not achieve optimality, 
More important. is the fact that such a policy would not necessarily 
be better than doing nothing at all. In Games 4 and 5, for example, 
noncooperative play achieves an optimal staggered drilling plan 
which could be frustrated by a drilling subsidy available to each 
firm. Furthermore, if a uniform subsidy were added with the cooperative 
drilling arrangements still being used, the subsidy could frustrate 
the contracts in situations where optimality might otherwise have 
been achieved. The key point is that the nonoptimality of noncoopera-
tive behavior derives not merely from "too little" exploration, it 
can also be a result of improperly sequenced information, a problem 
which a blanket subsidy cannot handle properly. 
These three policies do not exhaust the list of potential 
solutions. The possibility of the application of newly created 
incentive compatible institutions to guide petroleum exploration 
is an important topic for further research. Such institutions might 
include, but would not be limited to, aspects of joint ventures or 
field unitization applied at the exploration stage. 
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X. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The nature of petroleum exploration patterns in this 
country has led to situations in which the information provided by 
drilling is a public good. With a game theoretic model of drilling 
decisions, it has been shown that noncooperation can lead to suboptimal 
outcomes. Public policy discussions of method~ of handling this 
problem should take account of the common use of cooperative arrange-
ments to share information in exploratory oil field drilling. 
It was shown theoretically that under several reasonable 
conditions, private cooperative institutions are a natural result 
of the derived two person drilling game. The predicted success of 
the drilling iristitutions in such cases is mirrored by its common and 
successful application in the real world. 
The theory also predicts that the cooperative sharin~ 
arrangements might fail to insure optimal behavior from firms if a 
"battle-of-the-sexes" game situation is present. There is theoretical 
and empirical evidence to suggest that such failures may have 
increased in 1974, but the lack of data permits only an indirect 
test ;.;rhich yields ambiguous statistical results. 
Other suggestions have been offered for dealing with the 
information externality. For example, there exists (in each case) 
an appropriate selective subsidy to achieve optimality. However, 
the more easily implemented general or blanket subsidy has drawbacks 
which could make matters worse than doing nothing at all. For the 
moment, the small implementation problems and proven instances of 
success (even if the nature of failures is unknown) argues well for 
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the private cooperative arrangements. More research into alternative 
collective decisionmaking processes is needed. 
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APPENDIX I 
The basis for the solution in the weak sense of Luce 
and Raiffa ( [1957), pp. '106-109) is the stronger solution concept, 
the "solution in the strict sense." To examine the solution in the 
strict sense, some preliminary definitions are needed. 
Define a strategy pair (a,B) to be jointly inadmissible if 
there exists another strategy pair (a',B') such that each player 
prefers the outcome at (a',B') to that at (a,B). An outcome which is 
not jointly inadmissible is jointly admissible. 
"' "' If (a*,B*) is an equilibrium pair, and (a,B) is also an 
equilibrium pair, then the equilibria are interchangeable if (a*,S) 
and (&,B*) are also equilibrium strategy pairs. The equilibria are 
equivalent if they yield the same payoffs. 
A noncooperative game has a solution in the strict sense if; 
i) there exists an equilibrium in the set of jointly 
admissible strategy pairs; and 
ii) all jointly admissible equilibria are both interchangeable 
and equivalent. 
These conditions impose desirable properties of coordina-
tion and lack of conflict on candidates for "solution" to the game. 
However, they are strong enough that nonexistence is a real problem. 
The familiar prisoner's dilemma does not have a solution in the strict 
sense. In fact, the very concept under investigation here, the 
possibility that "reasonable outcomes" occur at pareto suboptimal 
points, precludes the existence of a solution in the strict sense. 
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The solution in the weak sense imposes the same conditions 
i) and ii) on the reduced game which occurs when players eliminate 
dominated strategies. As in a prisoner's dilemma, the solution in the 
weak sense can occur at a non-pareto outcome. 
For the two-person, two-pair strategy games of this paper, 
it is important to note the following: 
1) A dominant strategy equilibrium is a solution in the weak 
sense (it is the only strategy in the reduced games, so it 
is trivially an interchangeable, equivalent equilibrium 
in admissible pairs, thus a solution in the strict sense of 
the reduced game). 
2) When one firm plays a dominant strategy, a', and the other 
firm plays a best response, S', the pair (a',S') is the 
solution in the weak sense. (Again, trivially, (a',S') 
is admissible in the reduced game, and it is the only equilib-
rium in the reduced game.) 
Dominance in this paper is used in the following sense: 
a dominates a' if and only if 
[EIT.(a,S') > EIT.(a',S')) V'S' 
J J 
with> holding for at least one S'. a is a dominant strategy 
if it dominates all other strategies. 
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APPENDIX II 
Lemma: The solution in the "weak sense" of games 4 and 5 is the 
social optimum. 
Proof: The games are 
B 
D ND < r u 
w < r 
D r,s r,t 
u > w 
A 
s < t 
ND u,s w,z 
> 
s < z < t 
The solution is (D,ND). 
t > s so (D,D) cannot be an optimum. Likewise r > u rules out 
(ND,D). Finally r > w, t > z eliminates (ND,ND). 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3 
1. When production decisions must be made ex ante, information 
can be used to improve production choices in a way which 
increases expected profits. (See Hirshleifer, 1971). 
2. In fact, the complete profile of the structure may not be 
known until the entire production history of the well is 
complete, if then. But, Kennedy [1976] says, "Any wildcat 
has some value •••• At the very worst, they establish 
that yes, the granite is indeed only 300 ft. below the sur-
face, and everybody can now drop their acreage in the area 
and get on with better things. At the very best, a sig-
nificant new discovery is made, and everybody can now start 
hustling for rigs and tubular goods." 
3. See especially Arrow [1974]. 
4. Peterson [1975] gives an example from the Alaska North Slope. 
5. In a later paper, Peterson [1978] mentions these institutions 
in a footnote, but does not incorporate them in his analysis. 
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6. This paper will not cons.ider the more general topic of pro-
duction externalities between the properties. 
7. Personal communication with petroleum geologist Robert L. Isaac. 
8. "Complete" information is defined here to mean that each 
player knows the strategies and associated payoffs available 
to the other players. 
9. Given A3 and A4, if AS or A7 holds rather than A8, A9 cannot hold. 
To see this, consider A's payoffs 
B 
D ND 
D r r 
A 
ND u w 
AS or A7 => w > r. 
A4 => u > w 
-'> u > r which contradicts A9. 
It is also true that given A3, if A9 holds for both firms, 




D r,s r,t 
A 
ND u,s w,z 
I 
By A9 r 2:_ u, s > t. By A4 (the second part) u > w, t > z and 
(D,D) is the social maximum -++-. 
10. Kennedy relates that the principal difficulties he has 
experienced in dry hole contribution bargaining were: 
111. Operators proposing a test will have generally tried 
to argue a gross exaggeration of the value of the test to 
owners of surrounding acreage, while at the same time pre-
tending to ignore its value for their own acreage in the 
area outside the drilling unit. 
2. Nonoperator acreage owners around the proposed test 
have carried on a similar charade, pretending to virtual 
indifference as to whether the well is drilled, yet perversely 
insisting on its great value to acreage owners in the drill 
site unit." 
Kennedy's article is, in fact, an ·exposition of a particular 
bargaining mechanism, based on distance from the drill site. 
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ll. 30 F.(2d) 481 
12. 34 F.(2d) 589 
13. Personal communication with Harry L. Sprinkle, Executive Vice 
President of the American Association of Petroleum Landmen (AAPL). 
14 Personal communication with Robert L. Isaac. 
15. Personal communication with Harry L. Sprinkle and Robert L. Isaac. 
16. There are several measures of the amount of exploratory drilling. 
The data series reported in Table III is the "new field wildcat" 
count from the American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 
reported periodically in the Association's Bulletin. These 
numbers do not comprise the whole of what the AAPG classifies 
as "exploratory" wells, which includes new field wildcats, but 
adds outposts, extension wells, and deep and shallow tests. 
Roughly speaking, these latter categories are "exploratory" in 
that wells are not directed towards a known pool, but they are 
located on or near land with known oil producing capabilities. 
The new field wildcats are expressly those searching out new oil 
fields. 
Likewise, there are several methods of assigning an acreage measure 
to a given year. This data series, reported annually in the 
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periodical The Oil Producing Industry in Your State (published 
by the Independent Petroleum Association of America), is measured 
as of January 1 of a given year .. These data could have been 
assigned to the year just starting or the year just ending. As 
wells are drilled throughout the 12-month span, when economic 
conditions can change, the data reported here are the mean of the 
beginning and ending acreage for any given year. 
17. The only drilling failures which will be considered here are 
those resulting from the failure of the cooperative information 
sharing institutions, i.e., the possibility of an otherwise 
profitable well not being drilled because of a mechanical 
failure or bad weather will not be considered. 
18. For some producers, the marginal revenue of "new oil" was above 
its price in 1974 and 1975 because of the released oil program 
of the federal government, in which the production of a barrel 
of new oil "released" another other-Wise price-controlled barrel 
of old oil from the price limit. 
19. The price index used here was constructed as follows: nominal oil 
and gas prices were adjusted for changes in the maximum corporate 
tax rate, the percentage depletion allowance, and the investment 
tax credit according to the formula: 
PNOM(l - u(l - DA)) 
1 - y(itc). 
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where PNOM nominal price 
u = corporate income tax rate 
DA = percentage depletion allowance 
y proportion of oil and gas investments eligible 
for the investment tax credit (y was estimated 
to be about 15 percent) 
c = the investment tax credit 
(see Brannon [1975] and Cox and Wright [1975]). 
In 1975, the depletion allowance was repealed for all but 
independent oil producers of less than or equal to a certain 
amount of barrels per day. The criticial amount declined in 
stages from 2,000 b/d to 1,000 b/d from 1975 to 1980. The Oil 
and Gas Journal (1975] estimated that initially 150 firms would 
be made ineligible. The approach used here was to take the 
proportion of wildcats drilled by other than the 200 largest 
companies (for 1977, this figure was about 60 percent (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census [1977])) and multiply by the percentage 
depletion amount. The proxy .13 thus calculated was used for 
19 7 5 to 19 7 8 • 
Once the adjusted prices were obtained, they were deflated 
using the Consumer Price Index. (Another regression using a 
series deflated by the A.P.I. cost-of-drilling index was not 
as successful and is not reported here.) Finally, the adjusted 
and deflated prices series were converted to a L~speyres price 
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index using 1974 reserve additions and discoveries for each as 
the base year weights (American Petroleum Institute [1975]). 
Finding a nominal price series to be used as a basis was 
straightforward for oil. For years 1973and before, the average 
wellhead price of crude oil (American Petroleum Institute 
[1975]) was used. For 1974 and later, the appropriate 
federally regulated price ceiling for oil from exploratory wells 
was used (source: the U.S. Department of Energy Monthly Energy 
Review, various issues). 
The task of choosing the appropriate nominal price for natural 
gas was much more difficult, because throughout the period 
under study, there was not one but several markets to which 
new reserves of natural gas could be dedicated: the regulated 
interstate market and the various unreguh:i.ted intrastate markets. 
From the pattern of reserve dedications, it appears that 
prices in the intrastate markets surpassed the interstate 
ceilings in the late 1960 or early 1970s (Breyer and 
MacAvoy [1974]). Therefore, the average of i) Permian 
Basin (Texas) and ii) Southern Louisiana area federal price 
ceilings for new dedications was used for the period 1962-
1970. Finding the appropriate intrastate prices for use from 
1971 to 1978 was particularly difficult. For the years 1975 to 
1978, the U.S. Department of Energy Monthly Energy Review 
reported detailed figures on intrastate gas prices; again, 
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for this series an average of Texas and Louisiana prices was 










These numbers represent very rough extrapolations based on 
reports in various issues of the Oil and Gas Journal (August 
21, 1972, p. 34; November 27, 1972, p. 40; December 25, 1972, p. 
47; January 15, 1973, p. 40; January 29, 1973, p. 85; February 
5, 1973, p. 35; November 11, 1974, p. 29). 
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CHAPTER 4 
PETROLEUM PRICE CONTROLS WHEN INFORMATION IS A JOINT PRODUCT 
I. INTRODUCTION1 
Federal regulations which set maximum price schedules for 
crude oil production are, without a doubt, a major reason for the 
recent increased interest in the effects of pricing policy on 
resource production. The papers of Burness [1976], Montgomery [1977] 
and Lee [1978] demonstrate that, due to the intertemporal nature of 
the fixed resource problem, price controls, even those which appear 
to be "nonbinding" in a static sense, will lead to altered production 
schedules by profit maximizing, competitive firms. In general, 
whether price controls lead to earlier or l~ter resource depletion 
depends upon the rate of change of the spread between the world and 
controlled prices. Montgomery, based upon estimates of price behavior 
and of physical properties of oil fields, calculated that "if domestic 
oil producers had not been subject to price controls, and if they 
extrapolated recent OPEC pricing behavior, current (1977) U.S. oil 
production would be lower than it is now under price controls" (p. 52). 
The comparative statics of price controls is presented in Appendix I. 
Standard economic theory suggests that when price controls 
alter the production of some good X, other goods which are related to 
X through production techology or market demand will also be affected. 
This paper will show that there is another way in which production 
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decisions on seemingly unrelated deposits can be biased by the exis-
tence of price controls on one of them. This occurs if (i) the 
property under price controls produces information as a joint product 
with the resource, and (ii) there is a jointness of information 
between the two properties, and (iii) the existence of fixed costs 
of beginning development on the non-controlled property allows the 
availability of information to affect total equilibrium profitability 
conditions. 
Existing work has focused on the effects of price controls 
on the production schedule of the directly controlled commodity. Yet, 
such controls may distort economic signals to owners of other resources 
and serve to alter their production decisions. There are many obvious 
ways in which price controls on one commodity, X, can directly distort 
the production of another good, Y. First, X and Y may be joint products, 
or their production may entail common costs. Likewise, the demand for 
X and Y may not be independent. For example, the market for natural 
gas is connected in both respects to crude oil production. In some 
fields, natural gas and crude oil are joint products. And, natural 
gas and crude oil derivatives are imperfect substitutes for many fuel 
purposes. Finally, the ceiling on X may vary with production of Y 
(see Smith and Phelps [1978]), 
There is also the possibility that regulations are written 
so as to bring Y under controls even though it is a different resource. 
For example, the most striking aspect of U.S. federal regulations has 
been the rather severe set of price·controls placed on "old" oil, oil 
from "properties" already in production at the beginning of the OPEC 
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price increase. Other U.S. production has either remained free from 
controls, or has been placed under a much higher ceiling price. 
Presumably, the controls on old oil are an attempt to strip away 
intramarginal rent from owners of crude oil with lower marginal 
production costs. However, "property" was defined by the Federal 
Energy Administration to be "the right to produce domestic crude oil 
which arises from a lease or from a fee interest."2 Yet, given input 
prices, production costs are determined by physical properties of the 
particular reservoir. But if two reservoirs are covered by the same 
lease, production from them is classified together for purposes of 
determining old oil levels, even if production from one is substantially 
more expensive than from the other. On the other hand, if one reser-
voir extends beyond the "property" boundary, its oil can legally be 
produced at two different prices. The F.E.A. (now Department of 
Energy) has considered proposals to base the determination of old oil 
upon reservoir limits, but has dropped the idea because of the 
"enormous administrative problems associated with determining the 
limits of thousands of different reservoirs. 113 
This paper examines one other manner in which production 
schedules may be interdependent. Production from the price controlled 
site may produce joint products: the resource, and information 
valuable to the production from another site. The next section pre-
sents a model in which it is reasonable to expect that changes in 
the flow of the external information from one site will affect the 
production at another. 
158 
II. INFORMATIONALLY RELATED PRODUCTION 
Now consider specifically crude oil production. The basis 
for analysis, following federal procedures, will be the oil "property." 
Assume that the output of each property is identical in all physical 
aspects and that there are no differences in transportation costs. 
!.. 
Let there be a single oil price trajectory, Pt, which is known and is 
determined exogenously (say, by a perfectly elastic supply price 
announced by the OPEC cartel). Furthermore, let the physical produc~ 
tion functions of the oil from each property be independent. This 
second assumption is not made because it is necessarily a good 
description of reality. Rather it was noted in the last section that 
problems can be caused by production interdependence. The purpose of 
this section is to demonstrate some potential distortions which can 
exist even in the absence of direct production jointness. 
Next, suppose that there are two properties, X and X . 
s v 
X is a property already in production and which is subject to a price 
s 
ceiling, so its output schedule differs from that absent price 
controls. (Again, the mathematical derivation which shows that the 
X output schedule can be changed by price controls is presented in 
s 
Appendix I.) Let X be a property not subject to price controls, and 
v 
perhaps not yet even in production. By the above assumptions, the 
-price of the Xv output, Pt, and its production costs are unchanged. 
Nevertheless, there is the possibility for the price controls on X 
s 
to affect the production decisions for X . Suppose there is a jointness v 
of information between the two properties (in that production data 
from X also provide information about X ), and that there are fixed s v 
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costs of beginning well development. If this is true, the 
availability of production data information from X
6 
can affect the 
total optimization conditions governing the commencement of 
development of X , as well as other production decisions based on 
v 
knowledge about X • If price controls on X alter the X produc-
v s s 
tion schedule, the flow of external information about X will also be v 
changed. The change in the information about Xv can affect production 
decisions there. 
One special case of such an interaction is of particular 
interest: the case in which X is not yet in production, and in which v 
the decision to be made is when to commence production. Because of 
the fixed development costs, and with the knowledge of the nature 
of the external information from X , the owner of X may wish to wait s v 
to make a decision regarding the development of X until information 
v 
dependent on a certain amount of total production from X is received. 
s 
As the flow of information from X is altered by price controls, the s 
optimal decision date at X may also vary. Even though price controls 
v 
on Xs have not altered the price or costs at Xv, they have affected 
the total profitability conditions for commencing development. Speci-
fically, if production from Xs is speeded up, the owner of .X.., may 
hasten the date for deciding upon its initial development. 
These results are vacuous if there is not such an inter-
dependence between production at X and X , either because analogy 
s v 
comparisons are not valid, or because such information is not related 
to the production schedule. It was demonstrated in Chapter 3 that 
information interdependencies do exist, in that case at the level of 
···-----·-·-----·----··-·-------
-------~-- --· - - ~------:;::__._._::___ 
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the drilling of the first well on a property. Furthermore, it 
appears that firms do use historical production data from more mature 
properties in estimating reserves at other prospects. In the Petroleum 
Exploration Handbook by Moody {1961] the use of "analogy" reserve 
estimation is discussed: 
Production statistics and reservoir data are 
available on older fields, thus enabling the geolo-
gist or engineer to calculate actual cumulative 
recoveries in barrels per acre or barrels per 
acre-foot for any given field or reservoir. 
Nothing is of more value to the estimator than 
historical knowledge of a similar reservoir. How-
ever, these statistical yardsticks should not be 
used as a substitute for judgment, but as tools 
to make judgment more.accurate. (pp. 14-18) 
In particular, cumulative recovery data, focusing on the 
pressure of the "drive" in the formation, are said to be useful in 
reserve estimation. 
It should be noted that the information from X about X 
s v 
may be, but need not be, a message which is external to a firm. 
If the message is not external to a firm (because the same firm owns 
both properties) it should be argued that in planning production 
from X , the value of message about X is included in the calculations. 
s v 
In Appendix II, it is demonstrated that the result that price controls 
alter production incentives for the X property remains, although 
s 
under some circumstances the way in which production is rescheduled 
may vary if the information is included in the calculations. 
This theoretical exposition has been presented in terms of 
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"development." Using this terminology is not meant to exclude 
activities which are commonly called "exploration," and to the extent 
that oil firms make the same information - sensitive calculations 
in timing of oil exploration, .the .same conclusions .are ap,plic.able. 
Price controls can affect the pattern of exploration on non-
controlled prospects if the timing of the exploration relies upon 
information generated as a joint product of the (altered) production 
schedule of the price controlled wells. 
III. APPLICATION TO RECENT EVENTS 
From its inception, the U.S. crude oil price control 
program has had multi-tier pricing as a central feature. From 
1973 to January 1976 this took the .form of a price ceiling of 
$5.03 per barrel on old oil and world market prices for other 
production. By January 1976, the average price for uncontrolled 
oil was $12.99 per barrel. Beginning in February 1976, an upper 
tier price ceiling, initially $11.47 per barrel,was imposed on 
previously uncontrolled crude oil production. (Low production 
"stripper" well oil is exempt from price controls.) As of 
1978, about 37.54% of total U.S. crude oil production remained 
controlled as "old oil" (although both ceilings rose slightly 
during 1976-1978). 4 
The theoretical results of this paper, when considered 
in light of these regulations, suggest that if price controls 
altered the production schedules from old oil wells,exploration 
and production decisions on uncontrolled (later upper tier) 
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properties also could have been affected. 
By definition, old oil is produced from properties 
already in ppoduction in 1973. Further, areas ·that are most likely 
to be informationally related are proximate either physically or in 
type of structure. That is, among the uncontrolled (upper tier) 
properties, those most likely to be developed differently along the 
lines of the joint information model of this chapter are those 
located in the more mature producing areas. Oil activity on 
uncontrolled properties in more unknown or unusual areas would be the 
least likely to be informationally related to altered information 
streams from "old" oil fields. 
If Montgomery is correct and the U.S. price control 
program served originally to accelerate production and development 
from price-controlled properties. then one would suspect (based on 
the model in the previous section regarding the connnencment of 
drilling activity) that the oil exploration activity which followed 
higher prices for uncontrolled (upper tier) oil was relatively more 
concentrated in and around mature producing areas than otherwise would 
have been the case. (Likewise, exploration initially should have 
been less heavily focused on frontier or exotic properties.) There 
is some scattered evidence to support this hypothesis. Over the 
period 1972 to 1977, the "success rate" of oil exploration (defined 
as the proportion of exploration wells completed as producers) rose 
5 to an all time high of 26.97 percent, while the percentage of all 
new field discoveries estimated to have reserves of greater than 
·6 one million barrels fell sharply, suggesting a shift to less risky, 
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lower payoff areas of exploration. 
Frederiksen [1978] documents that these trends were 
reflected also in a drop in the exploration "finding rate" (barrels 
of oil equivalent found per new field wildcat foot drilled). 
Frederiksen points out that the data sources7 do not distinguish 
between truly "dry" holes and those with small but unproductive 
amounts of hydrocarbon, so that the increase in the success rate may 
simply reflect the reclassification of marginal new fields by higher 
prices and not a shift in drilling patterns. However, restricting 
attention to "new field" wildcats (as opposed to those which seek 
extension of or new pools in old fields), one observes similar 
increases in the success rate. Yet Frederiksen reports that 
historically the percentage of new field discoveries which have 
been abandoned as unprofitable within one year has been quite small 
(an average of .9 percent between 1970 and 1973, and an average of .3 
percent between 1974 and 1976). Therefore, for this one important 
exploration category, simple reclassification does not appear to be 
responsible for the observed increases in the success rate. 
These data are not intended to build a conclusive case that 
information flows are the only possible reasons for such observations. 
Frederiksen, for example, considers several other explanations for 
the apparent shift towards less risky exploration projects: stripper 
well pricing policy, availability of oil field supplies, price 
expectations, etc. These data are intended to suggest that future 
research on exploration patterns in the period 1973 to the present 
is one area in which the model of information as developed in the 
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previous sections of this paper may be helpful. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There are many ways in which price controls on one oil 
property can bias the production decisions at a second property. 
The direct effects through production and demand dependence are 
straightforward. There are undoubtedly other areas, such as changes 
in price expectations or gaming against the controls themselves, 
which still need to be examined. This paper has shown that the 
distortion of information flows is also a possibility. While no 
attempt has been made to quantify or rank the various effects, it 
seems that the use of inter-property analogy in petroleum exploration 
is considered important by petroleum geologists. Recent experiences in 
U.S. oil exploration provide some unusual data which are consistent 








Pt= world oil price trajectory, determined 
exogenously 
P = controlled price of domestic crude oil 
c 
(assumed constant over time) 
~ 
Clt - (Pt p ) c 
p as p + Cl 
t c t 
y = market discount rate 
xt = production of petroleum in period t 
C(xt) = production costs, c' > o, c" > o 
xt = resource remaining in period t 
The problem for the expected profit maximizing firm can be 
considered a problem of optimal control. In the case of price control, 
the problem is 
maxfT
1
{p x _ 





The Hamiltonian to be formed is 
1 { } -Y H = P x - C(x ) e t -
c t t 
the necessary conditions are 
a.i) 
<rn1 
c""(x ) - A.1eYt dX = 0 = p 
c c t t 
=> p - c""(x) = A.1eYt 
c t t 
a. ii) 
()Hl· • 1 
0 = -A. = ()Xt t 
a. iii) lim 1 {(P x - C(x l)e-yt -A
1x } = 0 
t+T c t t t t 
Likewise, the expected profit .maximizing problem for the 
firm that receives the uncontrolled price for its output will act to 
. 
subject to xt = -xt 
The Hamiltonian is 
H
2 
= {(P + a )x - C(x )}e -yt -A.2x 
c t t t t t 
and the necessary conditions are 
b. i) 
~=: = O = (P
0
+ at) - c'(xt) - A~eyt 
-> (P + a ) - C ... (x ) = A. 2 e yt c t t t 
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b.ii) 
b.iii) lim 2{{(P - a )x. - C(x ))e-yt -A.
2
x} = O 
t+T \ c t t t t t 
Since the firm faces the same resource constraint in each 
case, there must be at least one point at which the production 
schedules intersect. Denote x as production at time t with 
tc 
controls, x as production at time t when the firm faces world 
tw 
prices. Totally differentiating a.i and b.i results in 
x = tw 










Let t be one su~h time at which the production schedules 
intersect, so XA = xA = xA. At time t 
tc tw t 
~ - x,.._ 
tc tw 
A. I. 3 
which is positive, negative, or zero as y is greater than, less than, . 
a 
or equal to a ' the proportionate rate of change ·of the difference 
between the world price and the price ceiling. If xA is less than 
:~tc 
*tw' the price control production schedule intersects the market . 
price production schedule from above. If a is always greater than 
a 
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y, the rate of interest, there will be only ~ne intersection point. 
In this case, production under price controls is initially greater 
than in a free market, and resource exhaustion occurs sooner. If . . 
the relationship between£ and y varies, but £ is greater than y at 
Cl. Cl. 
the first intersection point, then production rates before that 
point are greater under price controls, but the ultimate exhaustion 
date may be sooner or later. 
With a two-tier price control (such as is applied to "old" 
and "new" oil) a similar result obtains. The first x production in 
each period is subject to the price ceiling P • Then a • x acts as 
c 




Suppose the firm recognizes that production from X yields 
s 
another good, information. Denote f (x ) as the value of information 
c t 
received from production x at time t when there are price controls. 
s 
Let fw(xt) be the value when there are no price controls. At time t, 
defined as in Appendix I as a time at which the production schedules 
intersect, the analagous equation to A.I.3 is 
x" tc x" tw 
If price controls do not change the value of the information, 
perhaps because (as was assumed in section III) Pt is exogenous, then 
·" .,... -a+ ya x - x = ~..,.,....,.--..,,._~_,_,~~~ 
tc tw C" (x") - f" (x") 
t t 
which yields exactly the same 
conditions as A. I. 3 as long as C" (xt) > f" (xt). The usual assumption 
about marginal cost is that C"(xt) > O. And it also would be 
reasonable to believe that the marginal information value of produc-
tion does not increase without bound as the production from the 
property increases, so that by some point f"(xt) ~ 0, making 
C"(xt) > f"(xt~ seem to be a reasonable condition. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CH.APTER 4 
1. This is a revised version of the paper of the same title 
appearing in the May 1980 issue of Land Economics 56, No. 2. 
2. 41 Federal Register 4940, February 3, 1976. 
3. 41 Federal Register 4938, February 3, 1976. 
4. The U.S. Department of Energy, "'Monthly Energy Review, 
May 1979. 
5. Oil and Gas Journal, July 16, 1979, p. 40. 
6. Oil and Gas Journal, July 16, 1979, p. 41. 
7. Both the Oil and Gas Journal and Frederiksen use a data 
base of the American Association of Petroleum Geologists. 
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